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Abstract
This dissertation studies mixed strategy equilibria with uncertainty aversion in strategic
games. Experimental evidence has found a substantial discrepancy between the prediction
of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium and observed choice frequency. The quantal response
equilibrium model of Mckelvey and Palfrey (1995) has been successful to explain observed
aggregate choice frequencies at least qualitatively. However, its fundamental aspect, in-
herited from the purification theorem of Harsanyi (1973a), that the mixing is not made
intentionally is not supported by experimental studies which confirmed the wide use of the
mixing device when it is given to subjects. This paper answers this question by proposing
a model which explains players’ intentional mixing in strategic games. In the first chapter,
we illustrate the main idea of this paper with examples. Then, we compare and contrast
the main conclusion of our study with the relevant literature.
In the second chapter, we develop the game theoretic model in which strategic uncertainty
is introduced and studies the e↵ect of it to equilibria, especially mixed strategy equilibria,
when players are uncertainty averse. The players’ perception of uncertainty in opponent
players’ strategies is modeled with random perturbation. Uncertainty averse players may
strictly prefer the properly mixed strategy in order to hedge against this uncertainty. We
define an equilibrium under perturbation as a profile of best response strategies to per-
turbed belief. We show that for any regular mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in finite
games and under the mild assumptions on perturbation structure, there exists a sequence
of strict equilibria under perturbations which converges to the given mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium as uncertainty in perturbation vanishes. This result has two implications.
First, in almost all finite games, we can find the corresponding equilibrium under pertur-
bation of any given mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. A discrepancy between them could
be substantial if the degree of uncertainty in perturbation is significant. Second, the the-
ory predicts that in equilibrium under perturbation, players intentionally mix their pure
strategies due to hedging motive. This implication is clearly distinguished from Harsanyi’s
purification theorem (and therefore the quantal response equilibrium model’s interpretation
for mixed equilibrium strategy), and consistent with experimental findings.
iii
In the third chapter, we test our model’s predictive power by re-examining the experimental
studies; Ochs (1995) and Selten and Chmura (2008). We then compare the performance of
our model with the QRE model and show that our model outperforms the QRE model in
both re-examinations. In the re-examination of Ochs (1995), our model’s predictive power
is significantly better than the QRE model in the reasonable range of risk aversion which
might not be perfectly controlled in the original experiment of Ochs (1995). Re-examining
Selten and Chmura (2008) also shows that the change in equilibrium prediction caused
by the payo↵ transformation is actually observed in the data, which only our model can
explain.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium does not have good predictive power for actual choice
behavior in many empirical studies. For instance, in games with unique mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium played recurrently between players (i.e., randomly matched from popu-
lations in which one population is for each player role), the aggregate choice frequency of
each population converges to particular stationary state. However in many such games, we
observed the discrepancy between mixed Nash equilibrium strategy and actual stationary
choice frequency.
Mckelvey and Palfrey (1995) proposed the quantal response equilibrium model (henceforth
QRE model), based on the seminal work of Harsanyi (1973a), the purification theorem, to
explain the observed discrepancy. Harsanyi (1973a) introduces private payo↵ disturbances
in games, which was unmodelled in the original complete information games. Each player’s
random payo↵ shock is assumed to be realized and observed only by that player before the
player makes her strategy choice. Thus, the realized payo↵ shock makes the players almost
always choose the pure strategies as a strict best response. Stochasticity of choice behavior
comes from the randomness of payo↵ shock, and not the result of deliberate randomization
of players. On the other hand, the players only know the probability distribution of the
other players’ random payo↵ shocks. As a result, the players only can expect the pure-
strategy choice frequency of the other players. They then make their strategy choices based
on this belief with their private payo↵ disturbances. Harsanyi defines the equilibrium in
disturbed games as a fixed point of this process. Consequently, the equilibrium is the profile
1
Figure 1.1: Generalized matching pennies games in Ochs (1995)
L R L R L R
U U U
D D D
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
1 0 4 0 9 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0
 1
of expected frequencies in the minds of other players. This result suggests that the mixed
equilibrium strategy does not mean the explicit use of mixed strategy, but the expected
frequency of pure-strategy choices in the other players’ belief.
The QRE model introduced several acceptable assumptions on payo↵ disturbance to make
the equilibrium model practical. For instance, the logit equilibrium model is the most
frequently used specification. With a particular specification, the QRE model suggests
that aggregate choice frequency is predicted by the expected frequency in the model. The
model seems to be successful because its predictive power of aggregate choice frequency
is significantly better than Nash equilibrium. The three games in Figure 1.1 are general-
ized matching pennies games used in the experimental study of Ochs (1995).1 The only
di↵erence between these three games is player 1’s payo↵ in the upper-left corner. Nash
equilibrium predicts that player 1’s choice would be the same in all three games since her
own payo↵ change does not a↵ect her equilibrium strategies. But the actual aggregate
frequency of player 1 exhibited the “own-payo↵ e↵ect,” that is, it increased significantly
with the increase in her own payo↵. At the same time, player 2’s actual choice frequency
deviated from Nash equilibrium prediction. The QRE model predicts this choice pattern
well at least qualitatively.
However, it has been found that the QRE model’s fundamental aspect which the model
inherits from Harsanyi (1973a) is not consistent with the observations made in several
1Players play games recurrently for around 60 rounds. In the experiment, an explicit mixing device was
given to subjects so that they could use the device in each round-game.
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experimental studies. As the purification theorem states, the QRE model predicts that
when aggregate choice behavior is in a stationary state, players’ pure-strategy choices are
strict best responses in each repeated single game. Thus even when the explicit mixing
device is given to subjects in experiments, they are not supposed to use it to mix their
choices. However, for example in Ochs (1995), the extensive use of the mixing device is
observed. Among 48 subjects, only 11 subjects were Strict Best Responders, so more than
3/4 of subjects intentionally mix their choices in each round-game.
As a whole, the QRE model proposes a way to resolve the puzzling phenomena that
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium fails to explain. However, its core aspect to deal with
stochasticity of choice - choices are almost always (i.e., essentially) pure-strategies in every
single game, but in aggregate perspective it is stochastic - is not supported by experimental
studies which provide richer observation by giving subjects the explicit mixing device. In
those experiments, people intentionally randomize their choices. The purpose of this paper
is to provide a new model, which describes such intentional randomization in strategic
games. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 illustrates the key idea
of this paper with examples. Then, we compare and contrast the main conclusion of our
study with the relevant literature in Section 2.
1.1 Main Idea of the Dissertation
1.1.1 Preference for Randomization
Many models of uncertainty aversion adopt a preference for randomization as a central
axiom since it was introduced by Schmeidler (1989).2 For example, consider the betting
example in Figure 1.2. The decision maker faces the urn having two red or black balls with
unknown proportions. She bets on the color of ball which will be drawn from the urn. Two
bets are denoted by fR and fB, respectively. She can also randomize her bets by flipping
a fair coin: to choose fR if it is head, or to choose fB otherwise, denoted by
1
2fR +
1
2fB.
3
2We refer to Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) and Battigalli et al. (2017) for the unified understanding of
this issue.
3There is an issue for possibly di↵erent attitudes towards ex-ante and ex-post randomization. But as
Battigalli et al. (2017) argues, commitment makes the distinction between ex-ante and ex-post random-
ization immaterial. In this paper, we consider the decision and game situations in which commiting to
3
Figure 1.2: Betting example with unknown urn and two-person symmetric matching pen-
nies game
sR sB a21 a22
fR a11
fB a12
1 0
1 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
1 0
fB
a12
 1
In this decision problem, as Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) interprets, the color of drawn
ball is a state s 2 S = {sR, sB} and the proportion of colors is a probabilistic model
p 2 ⌃ ✓   (S) that govern states’ realizations. In this problem, there are three possible
models, ⌃ =
 
(1, 0) ,
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
, (0, 1)
 
. Since the proportion is unknown, the decision maker
perceives model uncertainty. This uncertainty can be expressed by a prior µ over such
models. Here it is natural to consider a uniform µ on ⌃. If she has neutral attitude toward
model uncertainty, she will be indi↵erent between three possible choices. This is because
she considers this unknown urn identical to the urn having one red ball and one black ball.
Thus, there is no e↵ect of model uncertainty for uncertainty neutral decision maker. On the
other hand, if she is averse to model uncertainty, she will strictly prefer 12fR+
1
2fB to fR and
fB. For instance, suppose that she is extremely averse to uncertainty, so only consider the
worst model for each choices. Then, the randomized choice guarantees an expected value
of 1/2 regardless of which model is, but both of pure choices only can guarantee 0. Thus
the preference for randomization emerges under uncertainty from uncertainty aversion as
a hedging motive.
This paper applies this idea to game theoretic setup in order to introduce strategic un-
certainty into games. Consider player i in games. In her perspective, the profile of pure
strategies of the other players corresponds to the state; the profile of mixed strategies of
randomization (or to a mixed strategy in games) is available. In simultaneous-moves games, the limited
time frame to decide the final pure-strategy choice can be thought as an implicit commitment device. We
refer to Dominiak and Schnedler (2011), Eichberger et al. (2016), Saito (2015) and Seo (2009) for more
detailed studies on this issue.
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the other players corresponds to model, which govern realizations of pure strategies. Now,
suppose that the player i perceives the model uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty over the set
of the profile of mixed strategies of the other players. The player i thus forms a set of mod-
els (i.e. a set of the other players’ mixed-strategy profiles) with a prior. The player i’s pure
strategy corresponds to pure act, and her mixed strategy corresponds to randomization on
pure acts. To fix ideas, consider a two-person game in Figure 1.2. and the unique mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium, in which both players choose the equiprobable mixed-strategy, 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
. Suppose that the player 1 is concerned that the player 2 may make a slight mistake
or perturbation from the equilibrium strategy in two ways equally; the player 2 may play 
1
2 + ✏,
1
2   ✏
 
or
 
1
2   ✏, 12 + ✏
 
with a small ✏, equally. Thus the player 1 forms the set of
two possible models with uniform prior. If ✏ vanishes, then there is no model uncertainty.
Thus ✏ captures the degree of uncertainty. Now suppose that the player 1 is averse to
uncertainty. Then the equiprobable randomization on two pure strategies (i.e. the mixed
strategy
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
) is stricly preferred to any other randomizations (i.e. mixed-strategies).
This is because the equiprobable randomization perfectly hedge against the uncertainty
they perceives in the opponent’s strategy choice, which is exactly the same reason in the
previous betting example.
1.1.2 Mixed Strategy Equilibria with Uncertainty Aversion in Strategic
Games
This paper developes the game theoretic model in which strategic uncertainty is introduced
and studies the e↵ect of it to equilibria, especially mixed strategy equilibria, when players
are uncertainty averse. The player’s perception of uncertainty in opponent players’ strate-
gies is modeled with random perturbation as we have seen in the example of the previous
subsection. If she is uncertainty averse, she will be willing to hedge against the uncertainty,
and therefore may strictly prefer particular mixed-strategies.
To sketch the main results of this paper, we consider Game 2 in Figure 1.1. In this
game, there is a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; s⇤ = ((s⇤U , s
⇤
D) , (s
⇤
L, s
⇤
R)) =  
1
2 ,
1
2
 
,
 
1
5 ,
4
5
  
. Suppose player 1 assumes that player 2 would choose the Nash equilibrium
strategy, but at the same time, she has some slight doubt if player 2’s strategy choice would
be perturbed randomly. If she has a neutral attitude toward this randomness, such random
5
perturbation would not a↵ect her choice, and she would be indi↵erent to any mixed strategy.
But if she is averse to uncertainty, her best response will be
 
1
5 ,
4
5
 
, which is her maximin
strategy. She chooses this because the maximin strategy guarantees the expected payo↵
of 45 regardless of which perturbation is realized, and thus she can perfectly hedge against
the uncertainty she perceives in player 2’s strategy choice. The presence of uncertainty in
belief and the aversion to it forces her to choose the secure strategy.
If player 1’s best guess (sL, sR) for opponent choice deviates from the Nash equilibrium
strategy, her best response reacts to this change. For instance, if sL >
1
5 , then player 1
is willing to choose a higher value of sU than
1
5 . Two forces are combined to determine
the best response: hedging against the uncertainty versus reaction to the change in sL.
The best response function of player 1 is formed in this way and it is depicted in Figure
1.3. For player 2, the maximin strategy is
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
and she is willing to increase sL when sU
decreases. Thus her best response function is depicted in Figure 1.3.
Now, look at the intersection of the two best response functions. At this intersection, the
strategy profile sˆ satisfies the consistency condition. This consistency is a relaxed version of
the Nash equilibrium consistency condition because each player’s choice is the best response
to the belief which is formed around the opponent choice with random perturbation, rather
than to the singleton of the opponent choice. Thus we call this strategy profile sˆ the
equilibrium under perturbation.
In sˆ, each player’s equilibrium mixed strategy is the strict best response. Each player
intentionally randomizes between their pure strategies according to equirium mixed strat-
egy in order to hedge against the uncertainty she perceives in the other player’s strategy
choice. Thus the equilibrium is the profile of such intentional randomization. As a result,
our model suggests that each player would choose the equilibrium mixed-strategy in each
repeated single game (e.g., each round-game in Ochs (1995)) when choice behavior is in a
stationary state. In addition, the discrepancy between the mixed Nash equilibrium strat-
egy and the observed aggregate choice frequency can be explained as well. In Figure 1.3,
sˆ deviates from s⇤. Due to hedging motive, equilibrium under perturbation would deviate
from the Nash equilibrium. This deviation shrinks as the degree of uncertainty decreases.
This is because as the strategic uncertainty decreases the hedging motive reduces, so each
player’s best response approaches to the case without uncertainty. As a result, sˆ converges
6
Figure 1.3: Best response functions and equilibrium with uncertainty aversion :
KMM/MMR case
0.5   s1
1
0.2
  s2
1
BR1
BR2
to s⇤ as the uncertainty vanishes.
In this paper, we apply this idea to any finite games. We show that for any regular4
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in finite games and under the mild assumptions on per-
turbation structure, there exists a sequence of strict equilibria under perturbations which
converges to the given mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium as uncertainty in perturbation
vanishes. This result has two implications. First, in almost all games, we can find the cor-
responding equilibrium under perturbation of any given mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
The discrepancy between them could be substantial if the degree of uncertainty in pertur-
bation is significant. The theory provides the prediction of such discrepancy by formula.
Second, the theory predicts that in equilibrium under perturbation, players intentionally
randomize between their pure strategies according to the equilibrium strategies. This is
the point that our model is clearly distinguished from Harsanyi’s purification theorem, and
therefore the QRE model’s prediction for individual choice behavior.
4We discuss the regularity of Nash equilibria in Chapter 2.1.2 following Van Damme (1991).
7
1.2 Related Literature
1.2.1 Harsanyi’s Purification Theorem and the Quantal Response Equi-
librium Model
As Morris (2006) states, “Harsanyi’s purification theorem provides the leading interpreta-
tion of mixed strategy equilibria among game theorists today.”5 Indeed, Harsanyi’s work
(1973a) has been motivated to resolve the instability problem of mixed-strategy Nash equi-
libria. Harsanyi (1973a) claims:
“Equilibrium points in mixed strategies are unstable because any player can deviate without
penalty from his equilibrium strategy even if all other players stick to theirs. ... This
instability seems to pose a serious problem because many games have only mixed-strategy
equilibrium points.” [p.1]
Any properly-mixed Nash equilibrium strategies are weakly preferred. This is the essence of
the instability problem that Harsanyi pointed out. To resolve this criticism, he introduces
the random payo↵ disturbances, and assumes that the realized payo↵ is private information
and the other players only know the distribution of it. Thus, each player will choose pure
strategies with probability 1 according to their realized payo↵, but the players only can
know expected frequencies about how the other players choose their own pure strategies.
To see this idea more clearly, consider any finite games. Let Ui
 
aki , s¯i
 
denote the expected
utility of player i of choosing the k-th pure strategy aki where s¯i is the profile of the
other players’ mixed strategy choices. Suppose now that the random payo↵ disturbance ✏ki
associated with the k-th pure strategy aki is introduced in a following way,
U˜i
⇣
aki , s¯i
⌘
= Ui
⇣
aki , s¯i
⌘
+ ✏ki
where U˜i
 
aki , s¯i
 
is a disturbed expected utility of choosing aki . Player i’s payo↵ disturbance
vector ✏i =
⇣
✏1i , ..., ✏
k
i , ..., ✏
Ki
i
⌘
is assumed to be continuously distributed according to a
joint probability density function fi (✏i). Given s¯i, the pure strategy aki will be a strict best
response if U˜i
 
aki , s¯i
 
> U˜i
⇣
ak
0
i , s¯i
⌘
for all k 6= k0 . Then, due to the assumption that ✏i is
continuously distributed, the player i will choose pure strategies as a strict best response
5We refer to Morris (2008) for more discussion of the purification theorem.
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with probability 1. On the other hand, since the probability distribution of ✏i is known to
the other players, they know the probability ⇡ki that the player i chooses a
k
i ,
⇡ki =
Z
n
✏i:U˜i(aki ,s¯i)>U˜i
⇣
ak
0
i ,s¯i
⌘
for all k 6=k0
o fi (✏i) d✏i
where ⇡ki is the function of s¯i.
The equilibrium of disturbed game is defined as any strategy profile s = (s1, ..., sN ) such
that for all player i = 1, .., N and k = 1, ..,Ki, ski = ⇡
k
i (s¯i). The purification theorem shows
that any regular mixed-strategy Nash equilibria are the limit of equilibria of disturbed
games. In disturbed games, the mixed equilibrium strategy is the probability distribution
of pure-strategy choices in the other players’ belief. It does not mean the explicit use of
mixed strategy. At mixed-strategy equilibria in disturbed games, players almost always
choose the pure strategies as a strict best response. Therefore, mixed-strategy equilibria
in disturbed games are stable.
Based on Harsanyi’s work, the QRE model has been proposed to explain the actual
choice behavior in many experimental studies which the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
fail to predict. Several assumptions on payo↵ disturbance ✏i are introduced to make the
model practical. The most popular logit equilibrium model adopts the assumptions that
✏ki and ✏
k
0
i are i.i.d. for all i and all k with cumulative distribution function Fi
 
✏ki
 
=
exp
   exp    ✏ki       with     0. Under this specification, the following quantal re-
sponse function is obtained.
⇡ki (s¯i) =
exp
 
 Ui
 
aki , s¯i
  PKi
k=1 exp
 
 Ui
 
aki , s¯i
  
where   1 is the size of payo↵ disturbance.
Harsanyi’s model and the QRE model are closely related to the seminal works of Luce
(1959) and McFadden (1974)’s random utility model. The stochastic nature of choice
comes from randomness of payo↵ disturbance. Thus, the stochastic choice occurs invol-
untarily, and is not the result of intentional randomization. In contrast, in our model
the stochasticity of choice is the result of intentional randomization to hedge the strategic
uncertainty as we have seen in Section 1.1.
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1.2.2 Literature on Uncertainty Averse Preferences
In this paper, we employ two representations of uncertainty averse preferences.6 The
first one is the Smooth ambiguity preference of Klibano↵, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005)
(henceforth, KMM). The value of f by KMM is written as
V KMM (f) =
Z
 
 
✓Z
S
u (f (s)) dp (s)
◆
dµ (p) .
where   is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave. The second one is (the
second-order) Divergence preference, which is a special case of Variational preference stud-
ied by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) (henceforth, MMR). The value of f
by MMR is represented by7
VMMR(f) = min
⌫2  (B( ),µ)
⇢Z
 
✓Z
S
u (f (s)) dq (s)
◆
d⌫ (q) + c(⌫)
 
where c (⌫) = ✓D! (⌫ k µ) with ✓ > 0.8
Both representations have three common characteristics that are critical in our study.
First, they are able to represent aversion to model uncertainty. In our game theoretic
framework, the set of pure strategies of the other players corresponds to the set of states;
the profile of mixed strategies of the other players corresponds to the probabilistic model,
which govern states’ realizations. Each player forms a set of models with a prior µ, which
reflects her perception about the possibility of multiple perturbations in other players’
strategy choices. Then, the player’s pure strategy corresponds to a pure act, and her
mixed strategy corresponds to randomization on pure acts. Second, they are in general
smooth. The multiple priors preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) (henceforth, GS)
is the limit case of both models when the decision maker is extremely averse to model
uncertainty.9 The non-smoothness of GS model leads the di↵erent implication on the
6Battigalli et al. (2015) also use these two models in the analysis of recurrent games.
7   (B ( ) , µ) is the set of probability measures ⌫ on   that are absolutely continuous with respect to
µ
8D! (⌫ k µ) is a !-weighted  divergence of ⌫ with respect µ, which is well-explained in Maccheroni et
al. (2006).
9For the proof, see Proposition 3 in Klibano↵ et al. (2005), and Proposition 22 in Maccheroni et al.
(2006).
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e↵ect of uncertainty aversion to mixed-strategy equilibria. We will explain this point in
the next subsection and in Subsection 2.2.4 as well. Third, both representations adopt a
preference for randomization as a central axiom. Thus the players who are represented by
these models may choose the randomizations as strict best responses.
1.2.3 Literature on Game Theory with Uncertainty Aversion
This paper is also closely related to a literature on games with uncertainty aversion.10 The
most closely related paper is Klibano↵ (1996). His model proposes the following concept
of equilibrium with uncertainty aversion. Fix a finite normal form game with a finite set
of players {1, 2, ..., N}. Let ai 2 Ai denote the pure strategy of player i and si 2 Si denote
the mixed strategy of player i.
Definition : An equilibrium with uncertainty aversion is a 2⇤N -vector (s1, ..., sN , B1, ..., BN )
where the Bi are closed, convex subsets of P i (the set of probability distributions overQ
j 6=iAj) such that, for all i,
(1) si satisfies min p2Bi
P
a Ui (ai, a i) si (ai) p (a i)   min p2Bi
P
a Ui (ai, a i) s
0
i (ai) p (a i)
for all s0i 2 Si and
(2)
Q
j 6=i sj (aj) 2 Bi
The condition (2) is the consistency condition of equilibrium saying that the players’ beliefs
need to contain the truth. The condition (1) means that each player’s uncertainty averse
preference is represented by the GS model.
Indeed, Klibano↵ (1996) claims that “equilibrium with uncertainty aversion can justify
mixing as a (strict best) response to strategic uncertainty”, which is the direct result of
the use of GS model that adopts the axiom of preference for randomization. However,
due to the non-smoothness of GS model, Klibano↵ (1996) and our model provide the
di↵erent implication on how the strict mixed strategy equilibria are determined. We will
show this point with the following two example games. We first consider Game 2 in
Figure 1.1. Under the equilibrium concept in Klibano↵ (1996), (sU , sL) =
 
1
5 ,
1
2
 
is the
only strict mixed equilibrium strategy profile, as long as the player 1 has some belief
10See Dow and Werlang (1994), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000, 2002, 2014), Klibano↵ (1996), Lo (1996,
2009), and Marinacci (1996).
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Figure 1.4: Game 4
L R L R L R
U U U
D D D
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
2 0 1 0 1 0
1 2 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0.250 0 0.111
1 0 1 0 1 0
Experiment design
 2
assigning Prob(L) < 15 and some belief assigning Prob(L) >
1
5 , and at the same time, the
player 2 has some belief assigning Prob(U) < 12 and some belief assigning Prob(U) >
1
2 ,
respectively. Compared to the analysis with our model in Subsection 1.1.2, there are mainly
two prominent di↵erences. First, the predictions of equilibrium are significantly di↵erent:
our model predicts that sU >
1
2 and sL 2
 
1
5 ,
1
2
 
, whereas Klibano↵ (1996)’s prediction is
(sU , sL) =
 
1
5 ,
1
2
 
. Second, Klibano↵ (1996)’s prediction of equilibrium strategy profile is
constant no matter how the beliefs are formed as long as the stated conditions on each
players’ beliefs are satisified. Thus, there is no such result stating the convergence of
equilibrium with uncertainty aversion to Nash equilibrium as uncertainty vanishes, which
is the natural conjecture that the equilibrium with uncertainty aversion seems to have to
satisfy.
Next, we consider Game 4 in Figure 1.4, in which the unique Nash equilibrium is (sU , sL) = 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
. Our model predicts that there is a strict mixed strategy equilibrium, which is shown
in Figure 1.5. As we have seen in the analysis in Subsection 1.1.2, the equilibrium converges
to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium as the degree of strategic uncertainty vanishes. In
contrast, there is no strict mixed equilibrium strategy profile under the equilibrium concept
in Klibano↵ (1996). Instead, there are two pure strategy equilibrium: The first one is (D,L)
with the condition that the player 1 has some belief assigning Prob(L) < 12 . The second
one is (U,L) with the condition that the player 2 has some belief assigning Prob(U) < 12 .
This example highlights the di↵erence in equilibrium prediction of two models.
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Figure 1.5: Equilibrium with uncertainty aversion in Game 4 : KMM/MMR case
0.5   sU
0.5
  sL BR1
BR2
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Chapter 2
Mixed Strategy Equilibria with
Uncertainty Aversion in Strategic
Games
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Setup
Let   be a finite N -person normal form game,
  = (A1, ..., AN ;U1, ..., UN )
where the nonempty finite set Ai with Ki elements is the set of pure-strategies of player
i and the real-valued function Ui defined on A =
QN
i=1Ai is the unility function of player
i. We denote by aki the kth pure strategy of player i. A mixed-strategy si of player i is a
vector of probabilities assigned to the pure stategies,
si =
⇣
s1i , ..., s
Ki
i
⌘
where si 2  Ki 1. 1 The set of all mixed-strategies si of player i will be denoted by
Si. The set of all possible mixed-strategy profiles s = (s1, ..., sN ) will be denoted by S.
1We write  n =
 
(t0, · · · , tn) 2 Rn+1 | Pnk=0 tk = 1 and tk   0 for all k .
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si = (s1, ..., si 1, si+1, ..., sN ) is the mixed-strategy profile which represents the strategies
of all (N   1) players other than player i. We will write s = (si, si). The functions Ui are
extended to S by
Ui (s1, ..., sN ) =
X
(a1,...,aN )2A
Ui (a)
 
NY
i=1
si(ai)
!
where si(ai) = ski for ai = a
k
i .
We denote by C (si) the carrier of si
C (si) :=
n
aki 2 Ai : ski > 0
o
.
si will be called properly mixed if |C (si)| > 1. The carrier of s is defined by
C (s) :=
NY
i=1
C (si) .
We define the extended carrier of si by Ce (si) :=   (C (si)). Thus, Ce (si) is the set of
all mixed strategies that distribute all probability over the pure strategies in C (si). The
extended carrier of s is defined by Ce (s) :=
QN
i=1C
e (si).
The set of player i’s best responses to si is denoted by Bi (si),
Bi (si) := argmaxti2SiUi(ti, si).
We say that t 2 S is a best response to s if ti is a best response to si for all i. We denote
the set of best responses to s by B (s), hence B (s) :=
QN
i=1Bi (si) . The following is the
definition of Nash equilibrium s⇤2:
Definition 1: A strategy profile s⇤ = (s⇤1, ..., s⇤N ) is a Nash equilibrium of   if s
⇤ 2 B (s⇤).
2.1.2 Quasi-strictness, Strictness and Regularity of Nash Equilibria
A Nash equilibrium s⇤ is called quasi-strict3 if B (s⇤) ✓ Ce (s⇤) and called strict if B (s⇤) =
{s⇤}. Hence, a strict Nash equilibrium is a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
2In the rest of the paper, we denote Nash equilibria by s⇤.
3We follow the terminology of Van Damme (1991). See Chapter 2.1. of Van Damme.
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Let s⇤ be a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium of  . Suppose that each carrier C(s⇤i ) contatins
 i pure strategies, respectively. For notational convenience, we use the following notational
convention without loss of generality: We number the pure strategies aki of player i in such
a way that the first  i pure strategies a1i , ..., a
 i
i are contained in C(s
⇤
i ). Thus we will write
C(s⇤i ) =
 
a1i , ..., a
 i
i
 
for each i.
We can divide the players according to whether s⇤i is properly mixed or not. Let I denote
the set of players the strategy of whom is properly mixed, i.e.
I = {i 2 {1, ..., N} :  i > 1}
Consider s with C(s) = C(s⇤). For i 2 I, we denote by  i 2   i 1c the vector4
 i =
⇣
s1i , ..., s
 i 1
i
⌘
and let   denote the vector
  = ( 1; ...; i; ...; N ) , i 2 I.
Clearly,   2 Qi2I   i 1c fully characterizes s with C(s) = C(s⇤). We denote   character-
izing the Nash equilibrium s⇤ by  ⇤. We define   :=
P
i2I ( i   1) for future notational
convenience.
We define 'ki :
Q
j 6=i Sj ! R by
'ki (si) = Ui
⇣
aki , si
⌘
  Ui (a ii , si) for i 2 I; k = 1, ...,  i   1.
Let ' denote the vector
' =
⇣
'11, ...,'
 1 1
1 ; ...;'
1
i , ...,'
 i 1
i ; ...;'
1
N , ...,'
 N 1
N
⌘
, i 2 I.
' is a function from S to R  . When the argument of ' is s with C(s) = C(s⇤), we will
write ' ( ) with a slight abuse of notation to make the argument of ' more explicit. Let
J'( ) be the Jacobian
4We write  nc =
 
(t1, · · · , tn) 2 Rn | Pnk=1 tk  1 and tk   0 for all k .
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J'( ) =
@'
@ 
=
@
⇣
'11, ...,'
 1 1
1 ; ...;'
1
i , ...,'
 i 1
i ; ...;'
1
N , ...,'
 N 1
N
⌘
@
⇣
s11, ..., s
 1 1
1 ; ...; s
1
i , ..., s
 i 1
i ; ...; s
1
N , ..., s
 N 1
N
⌘ .
We denote by J⇤ the Jacobian J'( ) evaluated at  ⇤. Therefore, we can classify quasi-
strict Nash equilibria which are not strict according to whether they have non-singular
Jacobian J⇤ or not. A Nash equilibrium is called regular if it is strict or quasi-strict with
non-singular Jacobian J⇤. Harsanyi (1973b) showed the following theorem.
Theorem (Harsanyi, 1973b): In almost all finite games, all Nash equilibria are regular.
2.2 Equilibria under Perturbation
2.2.1 Random Perturbation
Let s = (s1, ..., sN ) be a profile of mixed-strategies. We introduce a perturbation  i =⇣
 1i , ...,  
Ki
i
⌘
in player i’s strategy si. Let pi denote the perturbed strategy of si by  i,
pi = si +  i.
Of course,  i should satisfy the condition that pi 2  Ki 1. We interpret pi in a following
way: When the player i is expected to choose si, the other players are concerned that the
player i makes a small mistake with the perturbation  i and therefore plays pi.
Next we introduce randomness in perturbation. We model the situation where the other
players are concerned about player i’s perturbation that the multiple cases are possible
with probability weights wi. Random perturbation of player i’s strategy can be written
as5
⌥i = ( i[1], ...,  i[Mi];wi[1], ..., wi[Mi])
where Mi   2,  i[mi] 6=  i[m0i] for all mi 6= m
0
i, and each  i[mi] has probability weight
wi[mi] with wi[mi] > 0 for mi = 1, ...,Mi and
PMi
mi=1
wi[mi] = 1. Since we mainly con-
sider perturbations with randomness, when we speak of a perturbation without further
5To avoid confusion, we will use [·] instead of (·) for the numbering by mi.
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specification we will always mean an random perturbation. The perturbed strategy of si
by ⌥i will be written as
Pi(si,⌥i) = (pi[1], ..., pi[Mi];wi[1], ..., wi[Mi])
where pi[mi] = si +  i[mi]. We denote by ⌥ the vector of all players’ perturbations,
⌥ = (⌥1, ...,⌥N ) .
⌥i = (⌥1, ...,⌥i 1,⌥i+1, ...,⌥N ) represents the perturbations of all (N   1) players other
than player i.
We will assume that perturbations associated with di↵erent players are statistically in-
dependent. Due to statistical independence, player i will face Ri =
Q
j 6=iMj cases with
probability weight
Q
j 6=iwj [mj ] under ⌥. For notational conveience, those cases are num-
bered with ri = 1, ..., Ri with probability weight Wi[ri] > 0. By an abuse of notation, we
will write
 j [ri] =  j [mj ] and pj [ri] = pj [mj ]
if  j [mj ] is involved in the rith case. Player i’s belief about the other player’s perturbed
strategies is represented by
Pi(si,⌥i) = (P1(s1,⌥1), ..., Pi 1(si 1,⌥i 1), Pi+1(si+1,⌥i+1), ..., PN (sN ,⌥N )) .
Pi(si,⌥i) will be reformulated in player i’s mind in the form
(pi[1], ..., pi[Ri];Wi[1], ...,Wi[Ri])
where
pi[ri] = (p1[ri], ..., pi 1[ri], pi+1[ri], ..., pN [ri])
is the profile of the other players’ perturbed strategies at the rith case.
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2.2.2 Uncertainty Averse Preferences
We introduce uncertainty aversion in players’ preference. Two models of uncertainty aver-
sion will be used: KMM and MRR. Firstly by KMM, player i’s value function of choosing
ti 2 Si under Pi(si,⌥i) will be written as
 KMMi (ti, Pi(si,⌥i)) =
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] ·  i (Ui (ti, pi[ri]))
where each  i is a strictly increasing and strictly concave C2 function.6 Next, the repre-
sentation by MRR is introduced. For notational simplicity, we denote by Wi the vector of
probability weights (Wi[1], ...,Wi[Ri]) 2  Ri 1, and by Qi any arbitrary vector of proba-
bility weights (Qi[1], ..., Qi[Ri]) 2  Ri 1. Then, player i’s value function will be written
as
 MMRi (ti, Pi(si,⌥i)) = minQi2 Ri 1
 
RiX
ri=1
Qi[ri] · Ui (ti, pi[ri]) + ci (Qi)
!
where
ci (Qi) = ✓iD
!i
µi (Qi kWi)
= ✓i
RiX
ri=1
!i[ri]µi
✓
Qi[ri]
Wi[ri]
◆
Wi[ri]
with a given !i such that !i[ri] > 0 for all ri and
P
ri
!i[ri]Wi[ri] = 1 and a strictly convex
C2 function µi : R+0 ! R+0 such that µi(1) = 0 and limt!1 µi(t)/t = 1.7 Thus player i’s
uncertainty aversion attitude is characterized by  i in KMM and ci in MMR. In the rest
of paper, when we write the value function  i without superscript, we mean both  KMMi
and  MMRi . The following lemma summarizes the characteristic of value functions under
uncertainty aversion.
Lemma 1: For a given Pi(si,⌥i), the mapping si !  i(si, Pi(si,⌥i)) is concave.
6We add the technical assumption that  i is a C
2 function.
7D! (⌫ k µ) is a !-weighted  divergence of ⌫ with respect µ. In this paper, we add the technical
assumption that µi is a C
2 function. We refer to Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2013) for this specific class of
variational preferences.
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The next lemmas will be useful in the rest of the paper. Lemma 2 shows that if a pure
strategy ak
0
i is dominated by the other pure strategy a
k
i at all cases ri, then the value of
choosing a mixed strategy si will be increased by moving a probability weight of ak
0
i to a
k
i .
Lemma 2: Given Pi(si,⌥i), suppose that for aki , a
k
0
i 2 Ai,
Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri]
⌘
> Ui
⇣
ak
0
i , pi[ri]
⌘
for all ri.
Then for si and ⌧i such that ⌧ li = s
l
i for all l 6= k, k
0
and ⌧ki > s
k
i ,
 i(⌧i, Pi(si,⌥i)) >  i(si, Pi(si,⌥i)).
The following lemma is an immediate result of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3: Suppose that Pi(si,⌥i) is given.
(i) If for aki , a
k
0
i 2 Ai,
Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri]
⌘
> Ui
⇣
ak
0
i , pi[ri]
⌘
for all ri, (2.1)
then si 2 argmaxti2Si i(ti, Pi(si,⌥i)) only if ak
0
i /2 C(si).
(ii) If for aki 2 Ai, (2.1) holds for all ak
0
i 6= aki , then
 
aki
 
= argmaxti2Si i(ti, Pi(si)).
2.2.3 Equilibria under Perturbation
In the rest of the paper, we assume that all players’ uncertainty aversion attitudes are com-
mon knowledge. We define the game  UA with uncertainty aversion as  UA = (A1, ..., AN ;U1, ..., UN ; 1, ..., N )
(KMM) and as  UA = (A1, ..., AN ;U1, ..., UN ; c1, ..., cN ) (MMR). We define the set of player
i’s best responses to si under ⌥i by
BUAi
 
si,⌥i
 
= argmaxti2Si i(ti, Pi(si,⌥i)).
The set of best responses to s under ⌥ is denoted by BUA (s,⌥),
BUA (s,⌥) :=
NY
i=1
BUAi
 
si,⌥i
 
.
We define an equilibrium under perturbation ⌥ as follows.
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Definition 2: A strategy profile s = (s1, ..., sN ) is an equilibrium under perturbation ⌥ if
s 2 BUA (s,⌥).
We can naturally generalize the concepts of strictness and quasi-strictness to our equilib-
rium concept. A equilibrium s under perturbation ⌥ is called quasi-strict if BUA (s,⌥) ✓
Ce (s) and called strict if BUA (s,⌥) = {s} or equivalently, for all i = 1, ..., N ,
{si} = argmaxti2Si i(ti, Pi(si,⌥i)). (2.2)
If perturbation ⌥ vanishes, that is,
 i[mi] = 0 for all i; all mi (2.3)
then there is no e↵ect of uncertainty aversion. The reason is that the best response is
identical: If (2.3) holds, then pi[mi] = si for all i; all mi. In KMM, since each  i is strictly
increasing,
argmaxti 
KMM
i (ti, Pi(si,⌥i)) = argmaxti i (Ui (ti, si)) = argmaxtiUi (ti, si) .
In MMR,
argmaxti 
MMR
i (ti, Pi(si,⌥i)) = argmaxti
h
minQi2 Ri 1 (Ui (ti, si) + ci (Qi))
i
= argmaxtiUi (ti, si) + ci (Wi) = argmaxtiUi (ti, si)
Thus any Nash equilibrium s⇤ of   is the equilibrium under vanished perturbation of  UA.
2.2.4 Example Revisited
In this subsection, we revisit the example of Game 2 in Chapter 1. We will show how
the strategic uncertainty is modelled with random perturbation and how the equilibrium
is determined under perturbation with uncertainty aversion. We also provide with this
example the idea of parameterized perturbation, which will be used in the rest of the paper.
Consider Game 2 in Figure 1.1. As we have seen, there is a unique mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium in this game; s⇤ = (s⇤1, s⇤2) =
  
1
2 ,
1
2
 
,
 
1
5 ,
4
5
  
. Suppose that for j 2 {1, 2}, when
the player j is expected to choose a strategy sj , the opponent player i is concerned that
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sj is perturbed by perturbations  j [1] = (✏, ✏) or  j [2] = ( ✏, ✏) with equal possibility.
✏ is given as a small positive value. To summarize, the random perturbation of player j’s
strategy sj is as follows.
⌥j =
✓
(✏, ✏) , ( ✏, ✏) ; 1
2
,
1
2
◆
Then, the perturbed strategy of sj by ⌥j is written as
Pj(sj ,⌥j) =
✓
sj + (✏, ✏) , sj + ( ✏, ✏) ; 1
2
,
1
2
◆
.
For the sake of convenience, we will use in this example one particular charactization of
uncertainty averse preferences which is the overlap between KMM and MMR. The value
of the strategy ti under Pj(sj ,⌥j) with uncertainty aversion is represented as follows:
 i (ti, Pj(sj ,⌥j)) =
2X
n=1
1
2
·  i (Ui (ti, sj + vj [n]))
where  i(t) =  e ⇢it. Since s1i + s2i = 1, it is enough to charaterize the best response
function BUAi (sj ,⌥j) with the first element of it, which will be written as BRi
⇣
s1j , ✏
⌘
.
The strict concavity of  i (i.e. strictly positive ⇢i) gaurantees that the first order condition
is the necessary and su cient condition for the maximizer of value function. With a simple
calculation, we can obtain the best response functions,
BR1
 
s12, ✏
 
=
1
5
+
1
10✏⇢1
ln
 
✏+
 
s12   15
 
✏   s12   15 
!
, and
BR2
 
s11, ✏
 
=
1
2
  1
4✏⇢2
ln
 
✏+
 
s11   12
 
✏   s11   12 
!
.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the best response functions of both players. Consider player 1. Her
best response to s⇤2 is
 
1
5 ,
4
5
 
, which is her maximin strategy. The reason is as follows: Sup-
pose s2 = s⇤2. Without perturbation,
 
U1
 
a11, s
⇤
2
 
, U1
 
a21, s
⇤
2
  
=
 
4
5 ,
4
5
 
. If the perturbation
is introduced, then
 
U1
 
a11, s
⇤
2 + v2[n]
 
, U1
 
a21, s
⇤
2 + v2[n]
  
=
 
4
5 + 4v
1
2[n],
4
5   v12[n]
 
. By
choosing s1 =
 
1
5 ,
4
5
 
, U1 (s1, s⇤2 + v2[n]) =
4
5 for any n 2 {1, 2}. Thus the maximin strategy
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guarantees the expected payo↵ of 45 regardless of which perturbation is, and she can per-
fectly hedge against the uncertainty. The presense of uncertainty in belief and the aversion
to it forces the player to choose the secure strategy.
If s2 changes from s⇤2, the best response reacts to this change. This is because now 
U1
 
a11, s
⇤
2 + v2[n]
 
, U1
 
a21, s
⇤
2 + v2[n]
  
=
 
4
5 + 4
 
s12   15
 
+ 4v12[n],
4
5  
 
s12   15
   v12[n] .
If s12 >
1
5 , the player 1 is willing to choose higher value of s
1
1 than
1
5 . Two forces are
combined to determine the best response: hedging against the uncertainty versus reaction
to the change in s2. The best response function of player 1 is formed in this way. For
player 2, the maximin strategy is
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
and she is willing to increase s12 when s
1
1 decreases.
Thus her best response function is as depicted in Figure 2.1.
Now, look at the intersection
 
sˆ11, sˆ
1
2
 
of two best response functions. At this intersection,
the following consistency condition is satisfied: sˆ11 = BR1
 
sˆ12, ✏
 
and sˆ12 = BR2
 
sˆ11, ✏
 
. As
we explained in Section 1, this consistency is a relaxed version of the Nash equilibrium
consistency condition. Thus the strategy profile sˆ = (sˆ1, sˆ2) is the equilibrium under per-
turbation ⌥ = (⌥1,⌥2). Here, we emphasize two important aspects of sˆ , which are closely
related to the main results of this paper. First, sˆ deviates from s⇤. This discrepancy could
be substantial if the degree of uncertainty (i.e. size of ✏) is significant. The discrepancy
shrinks as the degree of uncertainty decreases. This is because as ✏ decreases the hedging
motive reduces, so each player’s best response approaches to the case without perturba-
tion. As a result, sˆ converges to s⇤ as ✏ vanishes. Second, the equilibrium sˆ is strict in the
sense that each player’s strategy choice is strictly preferred. Thus, in Harsanyi (1973)’s
perspective, it is stable. The smoothness property of KMM and MRR is critical for the
strictness (or stability) of equilibrium. Suppose that each player’s preference is represented
by GS model:
 i (si, Cj) = min
p1j2Cj
Ui (si, pj)
where Cj =
h
s1j   ✏, s1j + ✏
i
2 R, which is the convex hull of the set
n
s1j +  
1
j [n] : n = 1, 2
o
.
Figure 2.2 clearly shows that the best response of GS model is non-smooth. Player i sticks to
her maximin strategy if s1j 2
⇣
s⇤,1j   ✏, s⇤,1j + ✏
⌘
and jumps to the pure strategies otherwise.
This property is due to its extreme aversion to uncertainty. We can find the intersection
23
Figure 2.1: Best response functions and equilibrium with uncertainty aversion : GS case
  s1
1
0.2
0.2+0
  s2
1
BR1
BR2
of two best response functions. However, in this intersection each player’s strategy is not
a strict best response. Thus, this strategy profile still has the instability problem for the
same reason of instability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, which Harsanyi (1973) pointed
out.
2.3 Nash Equilibria as Limits of Equilibria under Perturba-
tion
In this section we will show that any regular (i.e. strict or quasi-strict with non-singular
Jacobian J⇤) Nash equilibrium s⇤ has its corresponding equilibrium s under perturbation
⌥ such that s is close enough to s⇤ if ⌥ is close enough to zero. The next lemma shows
that for any quasi-strict Nash equilibrium s⇤ of  , if an equilibrium s under perturbation
⌥ is close enough to s⇤ and ⌥ is close enough to zero, then C(s) should be the same as
C(s⇤). To state the result, we need a notion of convergence of perturbation. Consider
a sequence {⌥(n)} of perturbation. We denote by Mi(n) the total number of cases in
perturbation ⌥i(n). Of course, Mi(n) may have di↵erent values for di↵erent n. We now
define limn!1⌥(n) = 0 if for any given   > 0, there exists n0 2 N such that for all n   n0,
    ki (n)[mi]    <   for all i; all mi = 1, ...,Mi(n); all k.
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Lemma 4: Let s⇤ be a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium of  . Suppose that there exists a
sequence {s (n)} of equilibria under perturbation ⌥(n) such that limn!1 s(n) = s⇤ and
limn!1⌥(n) = 0. Then, for all n large enough C (s(n)) = C (s⇤).
By Lemma 4, we can restrict our attention to strategy profiles s with C(s) = C(s⇤). Now,
we will consider parameterized perturbation for s with C(s) = C(s⇤).
2.3.1 Parameterized Perturbation
We define a perturbation structure {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0 for s with C(s) = C(s⇤) as follows: Let
⌥ (✏) = (⌥1 (✏) , ...,⌥N (✏)) where ⌥i (✏) = ( i[1](✏), ...,  i[Mi](✏);wi[1], ..., wi[Mi]).8 For all
i and all mi, each  ki [mi] (✏) is a continuously di↵erentiable function of ✏ on [0,1) such
that
(i)  ki [mi](0) = 0 for all k,
(ii)  ki [mi] : R+0 ! R for i 2 I; k = 1, ...,  i,
(iii)  ki [mi] : R+0 ! R 0 for i /2 I; k = 1, .
(iv)  ki [mi] : R+0 ! R+0 for all i; k =  i + 1, ...,Ki, and
(v)
PKi
k=1  
k
i [mi](✏) = 0 for any ✏ 2 [0,1).
Note that not all perturbations ⌥ (✏) in a given perturbation structure {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0 are
perturbations, because a perturbation should satisfy that pi [mi] 2  Ki 1 for all i; all mi.
But since each  ki [mi] (✏) is continuous for ✏ and  
k
i [mi](0) = 0,  
k
i [mi](✏) is close enough
to zero for a small enough ✏. Consequently, for any perturbation structure {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0, we
can always find ✏¯ > 0 such that for all ✏ 2 [0, ✏¯), ⌥ (✏) is a perturbation of s that is near
s⇤. To be precise, suppose s⇤ is strict and consider s with C(s) = C(s⇤). Then s = s⇤. We
can find ✏¯ > 0 such that for all ✏ 2 [0, ✏¯) and for all i and all mi,
1 +  1i [mi] (✏)   0, and therefore pi[mi] (s⇤i , ✏) 2  Ki 1.
where pi[mi] (s⇤i , ✏) = s⇤i +  i[mi] (✏).
Next, suppose s⇤ is quasi-strict but not strict, and consider s with C(s) = C(s⇤). Then
we consider the following construction: For each i 2 I, there exists ✏¯i > 0 satisfying
8So, it is assumed that for all i, Mi and (wi[1], ..., wi[Mi]) are the constants in any ⌥ (✏).
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the following: There exists a neighborhood N ⇤i ⇢   i 1c of  ⇤i such that for all ( i, ✏) 2
N ⇤i ⇥ [0, ✏¯i) and all mi,
ski +  
k
i [mi](✏) > 0 for k = 1, ...,  i, and     
 iX
k=1
 ki [mi](✏)
      < 1 and therefore pi[mi] (si, ✏) 2  Ki 1
where pi[mi] (si, ✏) = si +  i[mi] (✏). The idea of the above construction of ✏¯i and N ⇤i is
the following: Since  ⇤i 2 int
⇣
  i 1c
⌘
,
s⇤,ki > 0 for k = 1, ...,  i.
Thus we can find ✏¯i > 0 such that for all ✏ 2 [0, ✏¯i) and all mi,
s⇤,ki +  
k
i [mi](✏) > 0 for k = 1, ...,  i, and
     
 iX
k=1
 ki [mi](✏)
      < 1.
Then we can find a neighborhood N ⇤i of  
⇤
i such that for all ( i, ✏) 2 N ⇤i ⇥ [0, ✏¯i) and all
mi,
ski +  
k
i [mi](✏) > 0 for k = 1, ...,  i.
Also there exists ✏¯0 > 0 such that for all ✏ 2 [0, ✏¯0) and for all i /2 I and all mi, pi[mi] (✏) 2
 Ki 1. We define ✏¯ = min {✏¯0, ✏¯i : i 2 I}. Then, for ( , ✏) 2
Q
i2I N ⇤i ⇥ [0, ✏¯), ⌥ (✏) is a
perturbation of s. Thus, in the proof of Theorems 1 and 2, we only consider {⌥ (✏)}✏2[0,✏¯).
For example, consider Game 5 in Figure 2.2. s⇤ =
 
(13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3), (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3)
 
is a unique quasi-
strict Nash equilibrium. Suppose that the perturbation structure {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0 is given as
follows: For i 2 {1, 2},
 i[1] (✏) = (2✏, ✏, ✏) , wi[1] = 1
3
 i[2] (✏) = ( ✏, 2✏, ✏) , wi[2] = 1
3
 i[3] (✏) = ( ✏, ✏, 2✏) , wi[3] = 1
3
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Figure 2.2: Game 5
a21 a22 a23
a11
a12
a13
0 1 -1
0 -1 1
-1 0 1
1 0 -1
1 -1 0
-1 1 0
 2
Figure 2.3 is the mixed-strategy space of player i,   i 1. The end point of each blue line
from s⇤i represents pi[mi] (s⇤i , ✏¯), mi 2 {1, 2, 3} for some ✏¯ > 0. For any si in the interior of
the small grey triangle and any ✏ 2 [0, ✏¯), pi[mi] (si, ✏) 2   i 1, mi 2 {1, 2, 3}.
In the rest of the paper, we use the following notation: For a given {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0,
(i) Pi (si, ✏)
.
= Pi (si,⌥i (✏)).
(ii) We write pi[mi] (si, ✏) to express that pi[mi] is a function of (si, ✏): pi[mi] (si, ✏) =
si +  i [mi] (✏).
(iii) Similar to (ii), pi[ri] (s, ✏) = (p1[ri] (s1, ✏) , ..., pi 1[ri] (si 1, ✏) , pi+1[ri] (si+1, ✏) , ..., pN [ri] (sN , ✏)).
2.3.2 Existence and Convergence of Equilibria under Perturbation
Our question is if there exists an equilibrium s(✏) under perturbation ⌥(✏) which is close
enough to s⇤ for small enough ✏. The following two theorems will show that this is indeed
the case for any regular Nash equilibrium s⇤ and any perturbation structure {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0 ,
and that the sequence {s(✏)}✏ of such corresponding equilibria is unique.
Theorem 1: For any strict Nash equilibrium s⇤ and any perturbation structure {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0,
there exists ✏S > 0 such that s⇤ is a strict equilibrium under perturbation ⌥ (✏) for any
✏ 2 [0, ✏S).
Thus, for strict Nash equilibria, the convergence is trivial because the corresponding equi-
libria s (✏) = s⇤.
27
Figure 2.3: Construction of ✏¯
si
*
si
(1,0,0) (0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
Now, we turn to a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium s⇤ with non-singular Jacobian J⇤. We will
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For any quasi-strict Nash equilibrium s⇤ with non-singular Jacobian J⇤
and any perturbation structure {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0, there exists ✏QS > 0 and a unique sequence
{s(✏)}✏2[0,✏QS) of quasi-strict equilibria under perturbations ⌥ (✏) such that lim✏!0 s(✏) =
s⇤.
We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 5: For any quasi-strict Nash equilibrium s⇤ with non-singular Jacobian J⇤ and any
perturbation structure {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0, there exists ✏L5 > 0 and a unique sequence {s(✏)}✏2[0,✏L5)
of strategy profiles with C (s(✏)) = C (s⇤) such that
(i)   (✏) characterizing s(✏) is a solution of the following system of equations:
@ i
@ i
= 0 for i 2 I. (2.4)
(ii) lim✏!0 s(✏) = s⇤.
Based on Lemma 5, we need to show the following to prove the theorem: For small enough
✏, s (✏) obtained in Lemma 5 is an equilibrium under perturbation ⌥ (✏). That is, for all i
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si (✏) 2 argmaxti i(ti, Pi(si (✏) , ✏)). (2.5)
The complete proof is in the appendix.
2.4 Strictness of Equilibria under Perturbation
In Theorem 1, we showed that any strict Nash equilibrium has its strict corresponding equi-
librium under perturbation for small enough ✏, which is itself. However, for a quasi-strict
Nash equilibrium s⇤ with non-singular J⇤, the corresponding equilbrium s(✏) of {s(✏)}[0,✏QS)
may not be strict. It is notable that the uniqueness of s(✏) for a given ✏ 2 [0, ✏QS) does not
imply strictness of s(✏). The reason is that such uniqueness may result from the fact that
s(✏) should satisfy a system of equations, that is,
@ i
@ i
= 0 for i 2 I.
where |I| > 1. But the strictness of s(✏) requires that each si(✏) should be a strict best
response in s(✏), or equivalently, the unique maximizer of  i. Indeed, this is the essence of
the instability problem of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, which Harsanyi (1973a) argued:
A quasi-strict Nash equilibrium s⇤ with non-singular J⇤ satisfies the following system of
equations,
@Ui
@ i
= 0 for i 2 I.
where |I| > 1, and therefore it is locally unique (i.e. isolated). However, for each i 2 I, s⇤i
is not a strict best response in s⇤.
In this section we will show that the corresponding s(✏) to a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium
s⇤ with non-singular J⇤ is strict under some additional conditions for {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0.
2.4.1 Conditions on Perturbation for Strictness
We introduce the following assumptions on {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0.
Assumption 1: For i 2 I, all mi, and all k,  ki [mi] is an analytic function of ✏ on [0, ✏¯).
Due to this assumption, each  ki [mi](✏) can be written in a form
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 ki [mi](✏) = ⌘
k
i [mi] · ✏+ ⌫ki [mi](✏) for ✏ 2 [0, ✏A)
for some ✏A 2  0, ✏QS , where ⌘ki [mi] is a constant of first-order term and ⌫ki [mi](✏) is the
remaining higher-order terms. For small enough ✏, the first order term is dominant, so we
will impose the following conditions on ⌘ki [mi].
Assumption 2 (Order condition) : For i 2 I, all mi, and k =  i+1, ...,Ki, ⌘ki [mi] = 0.
This condition reflects the idea of properness concept of Myerson (1978). As we have seen
in the proof of Theorem 2, for any small enough ✏ and any s close enough to s⇤,
Ui (a
 i
i , pi[ri](s, ✏)) > Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri](s, ✏)
⌘
for all i; all ri; k =  i + 1, ...,Ki.
Thus all pure strategies outside the carrier are strictly dominated in all cases she faces, i.e.,
ri = 1, ..., Ri. With the idea of properness we can assume that the other players will make
their belief in a following way: The probability for player i to mix pure strategies outside
the carrier by mistake is much smaller than the probability she mixes pure strategies in the
carrier a little more or less by mistake. Thus, in any possible case of mistake,mi = 1, ...,Mi,
the order of perturbation for all pure strategies outside the carrier should be higher than
1.
We introduce the following vectors and matrixes for e cient expressions. We define
⌘i[mi] =
⇣
⌘1i [mi], ..., ⌘
 i 1
i [mi]
⌘T
.
By Assumption 2 and the fact that ⌘ ii [mi] =  
P i
k=1 ⌘
k
i [mi], ⌘i[mi] fully characterizes the
first order part of  i[mi]. The weighted average of ⌘i[mi] will be denoted by ⌘¯i,
⌘¯i =
MiX
mi=1
wi[mi]⌘i[mi].
We define the normalized vectors ⌘ˆi[mi] by
⌘ˆi[mi] = ⌘i[mi]  ⌘¯i.
30
Finally, we denote by ⌘ˆi the aggregation matrix of ⌘ˆi[mi], mi = 1, ...,Mi   1,
⌘ˆi =
h
⌘ˆi[1] · · · ⌘ˆi[Mi   1]
i
.
For small enough ✏, ⌘ˆi captures the structure of perturbation in player i’s strategy, whereas
✏ captures the degree of uncertainty. The following assumptions on ⌘ˆi requires that per-
turbation structure should be fully diversified.
Assumption 3 (Richness condition): ⌘ˆi has full row rank,  i   1.
In the rest of this subsection, we introduce several objects which will be helpful to the
examples and proofs in the next subsection. First, we define the following vectors
⌘˚i[mi] =
 
⌘1i [mi], ..., ⌘
 i
i [mi]
 T
and ˆ˚⌘i[mi] = ⌘i[mi]  ⌘¯i
where ¯˚⌘i =
PMi
mi=1
wi[mi ]˚⌘i[mi], and the aggregation matrices
⌘˚i =
h
⌘˚i[1] · · · ⌘˚i[Mi]
i
and ˆ˚⌘i =
h
ˆ˚⌘i[1] · · · ˆ˚⌘i[Mi]
i
.
We introduce ⌘˚i and ˆ˚⌘i because the following might be the most natural steps to think of
first order perturbations: We first consider the whole structure of first order perturbation
with ⌘˚i. Then we consider its normalized one ˆ˚⌘i. And then we obtain ⌘ˆi by eliminating the
last column and the last row of ˆ˚⌘i, since they are redundant for the rank condition (that
is, rank
⇣
ˆ˚⌘i
⌘
= rank (⌘ˆi)). Thus, the full rank condition of ⌘ˆi captures the requirement for
full diversification of the first order perturbation.
Next, the following objects are introduced for the consice expression. We redefine  i[mi]
as follows,
 i[mi] =
⇣
 1i [mi], ...,  
 i 1
i [mi],  
 i+1
i [mi], ...,  
Ki
i [mi]
⌘T
because it fully characterizes themith perturbation of player i due to the fact that  
 i
i [mi] =
 Pk 6= i  ki [mi]. Then we denote by  ¯i the weighted average of  i[mi], and by  ˆi[mi] the
normalized  i[mi]:
 ¯i =
MiX
mi=1
wi[mi] i[mi] and  ˆi[mi] =  i[mi]   ¯i.
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Similarly, the following vectors are defined for the higher order part of perturbation: We
write
⌫i[mi] =
⇣
⌫1i [mi], ..., ⌫
 i 1
i [mi], ⌫
 i+1
i [mi], ..., ⌫
Ki
i [mi]
⌘T
and denote by ⌫¯i the weighted average of ⌫i[mi], and by ⌫ˆi[mi] the normalized one,
⌫¯i =
MiX
mi=1
wi[mi]⌫i[mi] and  ˆi[mi] =  i[mi]   ¯i.
Finally, we denote by ⌫ˆi the aggregation matrix of ⌫ˆi[mi], mi = 1, ...,Mi   1,
⌫ˆi =
h
⌫ˆi[1] · · · ⌫ˆi[Mi   1]
i
.
2.4.2 Proof of Strictness
In this subsection we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3: For any quasi-strict Nash equilibrium s⇤ with non-singular Jacobian J⇤ and
any perturbation structure {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0 satisfying Assumption 1-3, there exists ✏QS⇤ 2
 
0, ✏A
 
and a unique sequence {s(✏)}✏2(0,✏QS⇤ ) of strict equilibria under perturbations ⌥ (✏) such
that lim✏!0 s(✏) = s⇤.
First, it is an immediate result of Theorem 2 that for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏QS), (2.2) holds for player
i /2 I. Next, consider player i 2 I. In Theorem 2, we have already proven that  i (✏) is a
maximizer of  i( i, Pi(si (✏) , ✏)) for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏QS). This is due to concavity of  i and
the fact that
D1h
⇣
 i( i (✏) , Pi(si (✏) , ✏))
⌘
= 0 for any nonzero h 2 R i 1.
9 (i.e. condition (i) in Lemma 5). But to show that  i (✏) is a unique maximizer, we need
to prove that
D2h
⇣
 i( i (✏) , Pi(si (✏) , ✏))
⌘
< 0 for any nonzero h 2 R i 1. (2.6)
9We denote by Dnh
⇣
 i( i, Pi(si))
⌘
the nth order directional derivative of  i( i, Pi(si)) for a given
Pi(si) at  i in the direction of h.
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In the following lemma, we will introduce the equivalent condition for (2.6). To get an
intuition, recall the value function of KMM.
 KMMi ( i, Pi(si (✏) , ✏)) =
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] ·  i
 
 i 1X
k=1
ski · 'ki (pi[ri](s (✏) , ✏)) + Ui (a ii , pi[ri](s (✏) , ✏))
!
For notational simplicity, we denote 'ki (pi [ri] (s (✏) , ✏)) by ↵
k
i [ri]. Suppose that there
exists some nonzero h =
 
h1, ..., h i 1
  2 R i 1 such that
 i 1X
k=1
hk · ↵ki [ri] = 0 for all ri = 1, ..., Ri
Then,  i (✏) is not a unique maximizer, since
 KMMi ( i (✏)) =  
KMM
i ( i (✏) + th) for small enough t > 0.
Thus, the condition (2.6) is equivalent to the condition that there is no nonzero h 2 R i 1
such that
↵i [ri]
T · h = 0 for all ri. (2.7)
where ↵i [ri] =
⇣
↵1i [ri] , ...,↵
 i 1
i [ri]
⌘T
. Let ↵i denote the aggregation matrix of ↵i [ri],
↵i =
h
↵i[1] · · · ↵i[Ri]
i
.
Then, the condition (2.7) can be written as folllows, ↵Ti ·h = 0. Finally, we obtain the next
lemma. The detailed proof is in the appendix.
Lemma 6: For any given ✏ 2  0, ✏QS , D2h ⇣ i( i (✏) , Pi(si (✏) , ✏))⌘ < 0 for any nonzero
h 2 R i 1 if and only if ↵i has full row rank,  i   1.
We now introduce the su cient condition for the full rank condition of ↵i, which will be
directly used in the proof of Theorem 3. To state the lemma, we need some preparations.
Given player i 2 I, without loss of generality we can assume that her Rith case is a
combination of the last case of each player j 6= i, that is,
pi[Ri] = (p1[M1], ..., pi 1[Mi 1], pi+1[Mi+1], ..., pn[Mn]) .
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We denote by [Ri \mj ] the case which results from the Rith case by replacing the player
j’s last case by j’s mjth case:
pi[Ri \mj ] = (p1[M1], ..., pj [mj ], ..., pi 1[Mi 1], pi+1[Mi+1], ..., pn[Mn]) .
With pi[Ri \mj ], we can express player i’s assessment in which only player j’s perturbation
changes from mj = 1 to Mj whilc all other players’ perturbations are fixed at their last
cases. We denote by ↵¯i,j the weighted average of ↵i[Ri \ mj ] and by ↵ˆi [Ri \mj ] the
normalized one with it:
↵¯i,j =
MjX
mj=1
wj [mj ]↵i[Ri \mj ] and ↵ˆi [Ri \mj ] = ↵i [Ri \mj ]  ↵¯i,j .
We denote by ↵ˆi,j the aggregation matrix of ↵ˆi [Ri \mj ],
↵ˆi,j =
h
↵ˆi [Ri \ 1] · · · ↵ˆi [Ri \Mj   1]
i
.
Finally, we define the following aggregation matrix.
↵ˆi =
h
↵ˆi,1 · · · ↵ˆi,j · · · ↵ˆi,n
i
,j 6= i, j 2 I.
Lemma 7: ↵i has full row rank if ↵ˆi has full row rank.
Guiding Examples for Proof
The following two examples will help us understand how Assumptions 1-3 and the non-
singularity of J⇤ provide strictness to s(✏). The complete proof of Theorem 3 is in the
appendix. We first introduce the following lemma, which will be used in the next examples
and the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 8: Suppose that all the elements of matrix P (✏) is parameterized by ✏ and that
lim✏!0 P (✏) = P 0 in the sense that all elements in P (✏) converge to the corresponding
elements of P 0 as ✏ tends to zero. Then there exists ✏0 such that for all ✏ 2 [0, ✏0),
rank (P (✏))   rank  P 0 .
Example 2 : Consider the following 4⇥ 4 Game 6.
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Figure 2.4: Game 6
a21 a22 a23 a24
a11 − 12
a12 − 12
a13 − 12
a14
− 12 −
1
2 −
1
2 −
1
2
− 12
0 1 -1 1
0 -1 1
-1 0 1 2
1 0 -1
1 -1 0 3
-1 1 0
1 2 3
 1
s⇤ =
 
(13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0), (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0)
 
is a quasi-strict equilibrium, since for i 2 {1, 2} and j 6= i,
Ui
 
a1i , s
⇤
j
 
= Ui
 
a2i , s
⇤
j
 
= Ui
 
a3i , s
⇤
j
 
= 0 >  1
2
= Ui
 
a4i , s
⇤
j
 
.
We write
J'i ( i) = J'i ( 1; ...; j ; ...; n) =
@
⇣
'1i , ...,'
 i 1
i
⌘
@
⇣
s11, ..., s
 1 1
1 ; ...; s
1
j , ..., s
 j 1
j ; ...; s
1
n, ..., s
 n 1
n
⌘
=
h
J'i ( 1) · · · J'i ( j) · · · J'i ( n)
i
where j 6= i and j 2 I. Let J⇤i denote the matrix J'i
 
 ⇤i
 
. Specifically, in any 2-person
games, J'i ( i) is a constant matrix. Also, in 2-person games, we can write J
⇤ in the form
J⇤ =
"
O J⇤1
J⇤2 O
#
In Game 6, each J⇤i has full row rank,
J⇤1 = J
⇤
2 =
"
0 3
 3 0
#
.
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and thus J⇤ is non-singular.
We now turn to perturbation structure. We assume that the first order perturbation and
the weights are given in the following way: For i 2 {1, 2},
⌘˚i =
2664
2  1  1
 1 2  1
 1  1 2
3775 ,
⌘4i [mi] = 0 for mi = 1, 2, 3, and
wi[mi] =
1
3
for mi = 1, 2, 3.
Assumption 2 is trivially satisfied. Also, since ˆ˚⌘i = ⌘˚i and rank(ˆ˚⌘i) = rank(⌘ˆi) = 2,
Assumption 3 is satisfied.
We will show that s1(✏) is a strict best response in s(✏) . By Lemma 7, this holds if ↵ˆ1
has full row rank,  1   1. Since this example is a 2-person game, player 1 has only one
opponent player. Thus, this condition can be simply written as
rank (↵ˆ1,2) = rank
⇣h
↵ˆ1[1] ↵ˆ1[2]
i⌘
=  1   1 = 2.
The function 'ki (sj) has Kj   1 independent variables,
⇣
s1j , ..., s
 j 1
j , s
 j+1
j , ..., s
Kj
j
⌘
, since
s
 j
j = 1  
P
l 6= j s
l
j . Also, '
k
i (sj) is linear in each s
l
j , l = 1, ...,  j   1,  j + 1, ...,Kj . Thus
any
@'ki
@slj
is constant. Consequently, we have the following:
↵ˆki [mj ] = '
k
i (pj [mj ](sj (✏) , ✏)) 
MjX
m
0
j=1
wj [m
0
j ]'
k
i
⇣
pj [m
0
j ](sj (✏) , ✏)
⌘
=
X
l 6= i
 
@'ki
@slj
!
·
0B@plj [mj ](sj (✏) , ✏)  MjX
m
0
j=1
wj [m
0
j ]p
l
j [m
0
j ](sj (✏) , ✏)
1CA
=
"
@'ki
@s1j
, ...,
@'ki
@s
 j 1
j
,
@'ki
@s
 j+1
j
, ...,
@'ki
@sKij
#
·
⇣
 ˆ1j [mj ](✏), ...,  ˆ
 j 1
j [mj ](✏),  ˆ
 j+1
j [mj ](✏), ...,  ˆ
Kj
j [mj ](✏)
⌘T
= J'ki (sj) ·  ˆj [mj ] (✏)
= J'ki ( j) · ⌘ˆj [mj ] · ✏+ J'ki (sj) · ⌫ˆj [mj ](✏)
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The third equality holds because
plj [mj ](sj (✏) , ✏)  plj [m
0
j ](sj (✏) , ✏) =
⇣
slj(✏) +  
l
j [mj ] (✏)
⌘
 
⇣
slj(✏) +  
l
j [m
0
j ] (✏)
⌘
=  lj [mj ] (✏)   lj [m
0
j ] (✏)
and therefore,
plj [mj ](sj (✏) , ✏) 
MjX
m
0
j=1
wj [m
0
j ]p
l
j [m
0
j ](sj (✏) , ✏) =  
l
j [mj ] (✏) 
MjX
m
0
j=1
wj [m
0
j ] 
l
j [m
0
j ](✏) =  ˆ
l
j [mj ](✏).
Note that J'ki (sj) is di↵erent from J'ki ( j), that is,
J'ki (sj) =
"
@'ki
@s1j
, ...,
@'ki
@s
 j 1
j
,
@'ki
@s
 j+1
j
, ...,
@'ki
@sKij
#
, whereas
J'ki ( j) =
"
@'ki
@s1j
, ...,
@'ki
@s
 j 1
j
#
.
Then, we have the following formula:
↵ˆi [mj ] =
2664
↵ˆ1i [mj ]
...
↵ˆ i 1i [mj ]
3775 = J'i ( j) · ⌘ˆj [mj ] · ✏+ J'i(sj) · ⌫ˆj [mj ](✏).
Finally, we have the following.
↵ˆ1,2 =
h
↵ˆ1[1] ↵ˆ1[2]
i
= ✏ · J⇤1 ·
h
⌘ˆ2 [1] ⌘ˆ2 [2]
i
+ J'1(sj) ·
h
⌫ˆ2[1](✏) ⌫ˆ2[2](✏)
i
= ✏ · J⇤1 · ⌘ˆ2 + J'1(s2) · ⌫ˆ2(✏).
We can divide the above equation by any non-zero ✏, and then we have
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1✏
↵ˆ1,2 =J
⇤
1 · ⌘ˆ2 +R1(✏).
where R1(✏) = J'1(s2) · 1✏ ⌫ˆ2(✏). By Assumption 2, the lowest order of ✏ in any elements of
the matrix 1✏ ⌫ˆ2(✏) is equal to 1. Also, J'1(s2) is a constant matrix. Thus, lim✏!0R1(✏) = 0
and we have the following equation.
lim
✏!0
✓
1
✏
↵ˆ1
◆
= J⇤1 · ⌘ˆ2.
By Lemma 8, there exists ✏(1) such that for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏(1))
rank
✓
1
✏
↵ˆ1
◆
  rank (J⇤1 · ⌘ˆ2) .
By Assumption 3, ⌘ˆ2 has full row rank. We use the property that if a matrix Q has full
row rank, then rank(PQ) = rank(P ). By this property, rank (J⇤1 · ⌘ˆ2) = rank (J⇤1 ) =  1 1.
Consequently, for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏(1))
rank (↵ˆ1) = rank
✓
1
✏
↵ˆ1
◆
   1   1,
which implies that rank (↵ˆ1) is  1   1 and thus s1(✏) is strictly preferred. 
Example 2 showed how the order condition and richness condition play their roles for si(✏)
to be a strict best response in s(✏) . It also showed that the full row-rank condition of the
matrix J'i( i) is critical. This condition comes from the fact that
(i) J'i( i) is constant as J
⇤
i and
(ii) J⇤i has full row rank.
(ii) holds because J⇤ is non-singular. But (i) held in the previous example because Jacobian
is constant in 2-person games, to be precise, in games where |I| = 2. The next example
will show that condition (i) may not hold for games where |I| > 2. But si(✏) will still be
strictly preferred for any small enough ✏ due to the fact that
lim
✏!0 J'i( i)|pi[ri](s(✏),✏) = J'i( i)|s⇤i = J
⇤
i .
Example 3 (3-person game): Consider the following 4⇥ 3⇥ 2 Game 7 in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Game 7
a21 a22 a23
a11
a12
a14
a13
a31
-3 -2 -4
0 -1 1
9 9 9
-4 -3 -2
1 0 -1
9 9 9
-2 -4 -3
-1 1 0
9 9 9
3 3 3
0 0 0
-9 -9 -9
 1
a21 a22 a23
a11
a12
a14
a13
a32
3 4 2
0 -1 1
-9 -9 -9
2 3 4
1 0 -1
-9 -9 -9
4 2 3
-1 1 0
-9 -9 -9
-3 -3 -3
0 0 0
9 9 9
 2
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In Game 7, player 1 has an interaction with player 2 and player 3, but player 2 and player
3 are interacted with only player 1, respectively. Player 1’s actions can be divided into
two groups; playing the constant sum games with player 2,
 
a11, a
2
1, a
4
1
 
, or not playing the
game with player 2,
 
a31
 
10. And each group of actions has a conflict with player 3’s action
choice.
In Game 7, s⇤ =
 
(16 ,
1
6 ,
1
2 ,
1
6), (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3), (
1
2 ,
1
2)
 
is a quasi-strict equilibrium. Jacobian J' ( )
is as follows.
J' ( ) = J'
 
s11, s
2
1, s
3
1; s
1
2, s
2
2; s
1
3
 
=
266666666664
O3⇥3
0 3
 3 0
 2s13 + 1 2s13   1
0
0
2
 
6  s12 + s22
 
0  3  1
3 0 1
O2⇥2
0
0
0 0  36 0 0 O1⇥1
377777777775
s⇤ has non-singular Jacobian J⇤,
J⇤ = J' ( )|s⇤ =
266666666664
O3⇥3
0 3
 3 0
0 0
0
0
12
0  3  1
3 0 1
O2⇥2
0
0
0 0  36 0 0 O1⇥1
377777777775
.
We assume that the first order perturbation and the weights for each player are given in
the following way under Assumptions 1-3:
.
10We intentionally label the player 1’s actions in the above way.
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⌘˚1 =
2666664
3  1  1  1
 1 3  1  1
 1  1 3  1
 1  1  1 3
3777775 , ⌘˚2 =
2664
2  1  1
 1 2  1
 1  1 2
3775 , ⌘˚3 =
"
1  1
 1 1
#
, and
wi[mi] =
1
Mi
for all i; all mi.
where M1 = 4, M2 = 3 and M3 = 2.
We will show that ↵ˆ1 =
h
↵ˆ1,2 ↵ˆ1,3
i
has full row rank,  1   1, which implies that s1(✏)
is strictly preferred. Consider
↵ˆ1,j =
h
↵ˆ1 [R1 \ 1] · · · ↵ˆ1 [R1 \Mj   1]
i
.
To reformulate the mjth column vector ↵ˆ1 [R1 \mj ], we first consider the kth element of
it,
↵ˆk1 [R1 \mj ] = ↵k1 [R1 \mj ]  ↵¯k1,j .
Since ↵k1 [R1 \mj ] and ↵k1
h
R1 \m0j
i
only di↵er in player j’s perturbation,
↵ˆk1 [R1 \mj ] =
"
@'k1
@s1j
, ...,
@'k1
@s
 j 1
j
#
p1[R1](s(✏),✏)
·
⇣
 ˆ1j [mj ](✏), ...,  ˆ
 j 1
j [mj ](✏)
⌘T
= J'k1 ( j)
   
p1[R1](s(✏),✏)
·  ˆj [mj ](✏)
Note that J'ki ( j) is not a function of  j , since it is the first-order partial derivative of
'ki which is linear in each s
k
j . Thus we can simply express that J'k1 ( j) is evaluated at
p1 [R1] (s (✏) , ✏) as above. For instance, consider that j = 2. In the expression of J'( )
above, we can find that
J'31( 2) =
h
 2s13 + 1 2s13   1
i
which depends only on s13 and does not involve any term s
k
2. Thus,
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J'31( 2)
   
p1[R1](s(✏),✏)
= J'31( 2)
   
p3[M3](s(✏),✏)
=
h
 2p13 [M3] (s (✏) , ✏) + 1 2p13 [M3] (s (✏) , ✏)  1
i
.
Then, we have that
↵ˆ1 [R1 \mj ] =
2664
↵ˆ11 [R1 \mj ]
...
↵ˆ 1 11 [R1 \mj ]
3775 = J'1( j)|p1[R1](s(✏),✏) ·  ˆj [mj ] (✏)
and that
↵ˆ1,j =
h
↵ˆ1 [R1 \ 1] · · · ↵ˆ1 [R1 \Mj   1]
i
= J'1( j)|p1[R1](s(✏),✏) ·
h
 ˆj [1] (✏) · · ·  ˆj [Mj   1] (✏)
i
= J'1( j)|p1[R1](s(✏),✏) · ⌘ˆj · ✏+ J'1( j)|p1[R1](s(✏),✏) · ⌫ˆj (✏)
Finally, for any nonzero ✏, we can merge 1✏ ↵ˆ1,2 and
1
✏ ↵ˆ1,3, and obtain
1
✏ ↵ˆ1.
1
✏
↵ˆ1 =
h
1
✏ ↵ˆ1,2
1
✏ ↵ˆ1,3
i
=
h
J'1( 2) J'1( 3)
i    p1[R1](s(✏),✏) ·
"
⌘ˆ2 +
1
✏ ⌫ˆ2 (✏) O
O ⌘ˆ3 +
1
✏ ⌫ˆ3 (✏)
#
= J'1( 1)|p1[R1](s(✏),✏) · ⇤1 +
h
R1,2(✏) R1,3(✏)
i
where
⇤1 =
"
⌘ˆ2 O
O ⌘ˆ3
#
, and
R1,j(✏) = J'1( j)|p1[R1](s(✏),✏) ·
1
✏
⌫ˆj(✏).
Then, we have that lim✏!0 1✏ ↵ˆ1 = J
⇤
1 · ⇤1, because
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lim
✏!0 J'1 ( 1)| p1[R1](s(✏),✏) = J'1 ( 1)| ⇤1 = J
⇤
i ,
lim
✏!0
1
✏
⌫ˆj(✏) = 0, and thus lim
✏!0R1,j(✏) = 0.
Therefore, by Lemma 8, there exists ✏(1) > 0 such for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏(1)),
rank
✓
1
✏
↵ˆ1
◆
  rank (J⇤1 · ⇤1) .
⇤1 has full row rank since ⌘ˆ2 and ⌘ˆ3 have full row rank. Also, J⇤1 has full row rank,  1  1,
since J⇤ is non-singular. Consequently, for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏(1)), rank (↵ˆ1) =  1   1.
Similarly, there exists ✏(i) for i = 2, 3 such that for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏(i)), rank (↵ˆi) =  i   1.
Finally, we set ✏QS⇤ = mini2I
 
✏(i)
 
. Then for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏QS⇤), each si (✏) is strictly
preferred and s(✏) is strict.
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Chapter 3
Testing Mixed-strategy Equilibria
with Uncertainty Aversion: a
Re-Examination of Experimental
Studies
In this chapter, we test our model’s predictive power by re-examining the experimental
studies; Ochs (1995) and Selten and Chmura (2008). We then compare the performance of
our model with the QRE model and show that our model outperforms the QRE model in
both re-examinations. In the re-examination of Ochs (1995), our model’s predictive power
is significantly better than the QRE model in the reasonable range of risk aversion which
might not be perfectly controlled in the original experiment of Ochs (1995). Re-examining
Selten and Chmura (2008) also shows that the change in equilibrium prediction caused
by the payo↵ transformation is actually observed in the data, which only our model can
explain.
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3.1 Re-examination of Ochs (1995)
In this section, we will first report the results of an experimental study by Ochs (1995),
and the over-prediction problem of QRE model. Goeree et al. (2003) argues that the over-
prediction of the QRE model is because of the failure of risk control in Ochs’ experiment,
and re-estimates the QRE model with consideration of the risk aversion of the subjects.
They found that under the constant relative risk aversion specification, the estimated
value of the risk aversion parameter is 0.42. However, this value is much higher than
the estimated risk aversion parameter from the lottery-choice experiment in their study,
which is 0.31. We show that the equilibrium under perturbation model can explain the
observation with much lower risk aversion, 0.22, and that with this risk aversion value,
there is a still significant over-prediction in the QRE model.
3.1.1 Summary of Results in Ochs (1995) and Over-prediction Problem
of the QRE model
Three games in Figure 1.1 are used in Ochs (1995). Player 1’s payo↵ in the upper-left
corner is only di↵erent in these three games. We will denote by A 2 {1, 4, 9} the upper-
left corner payo↵ of player 1. The experiment design is as follows: For each game, 16
subjects participated with fixed roles (player 1 or player 2) for 56-64 rounds. For each
round, the subjects were randomly matched. Risk attitude was controlled by the binary
lottery procedure. Outcome feedback is given to players after each round’s play.
The Nash equilibrium predictions and the observed choice frequencies are depicted in Figure
3.1. For instance, N9 and O9 are the Nash equilibrium and the observed frequencies when
A = 9, respectively. As depicted, there is a substantial discrepancy between the Nash
equilibrium and actual choice when A = 4 or 9, that is, when the game is asymmetric. As
we can see in Figure 3.2, the cumulative frequency converges to the steady state. In Figure
3.2, the black dot is the choice frequency in each round and the blue line is the cumulative
frequency. All the frequencies are aggregated for both groups of players.
Next, we show the best-fitting QRE model for asymmetric cases.1 Before estimation, we
first need to convert payo↵s in each game into the following form in Figure 3.3. In Ochs
1We re-estimated the QRE model based on the MATLAB code in Goeree et al. (2016).
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Figure 3.1: Nash equilibria and observed frequencies in Ochs (1995)
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experiments, the subjects were paid using a binary lottery procedure, and the probability
of getting a reward in the lottery was determined by the total percentage of the maximum
possible points (payo↵s) accumulated over the whole experiment. Thus, we need to convert
the original payo↵s into the form of Figure 3.3 so that the exchange rate of accumulated
payo↵s to the expected reward in the lottery is the same for each player. This conversion is
necessary for both models (i.e., the QRE model and our model) because the best response
structures of both models are a↵ected by a positive scalar multiple of a player’s payo↵s.2
Figure 3.4 shows the best fitting QRE model. We observe that the QRE model over-predicts
player 1’s choice frequency sU in both game 2 and game 3.
3.1.2 Estimation Results
For estimation of our model, we use the specification of perturbation structure and prefer-
ences as in Subsection 2.2.4. Our model has two parameters in the best response, ⇢ and ✏.
2See McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) for more detailed explanation.
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Figure 3.2: Choice frequencies in Ochs (1995)
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Figure 3.3: Normalized payo↵ for estimation in Ochs (1995)
L R L R L R
U U U
D D D
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0.250 0 0.111
1 0 1 0 1 0
 1
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Figure 3.4: Over-prediction of the QRE model in Ochs (1995)
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To make the number of parameters to be estimated the same in both models, we assume
that ⇢1 = ⇢2 = 5, which is the moderate value of uncertainty aversion in the sense that
the non-linearity of the best response function is not strong.3 Thus, we estimate ✏ which
captures the degree of strategic uncertainty. In the QRE model, the object estimated is
the precision parameter.
For both models, as Goeree et al. (2003), we assume that risk attitude in the experiment
is not perfectly controlled by the binary lottery procedure. That is, all payo↵s in Figure
2.3 are the utility unit, only when the risk attitudes of the players are well controlled
as a risk-neutral. We transform the payo↵s in Figure 2.3 into utility units by using the
constant relative risk aversion, U(x) = x1 r as in Goeree et al. (2003). To summarize, the
risk aversion parameter r is the object that we estimate additionally.
The results obtained are as follows: as Goeree et al. (2003) reported, the best fitting QRE
model requires the high value of risk aversion parameter, r = 0.42. Figure 2.5 is the result.
The reason for the high risk aversion estimate is straightforward. If the risk aversion is
high, then the Nash equilibrium prediction of sL increases, and thus gets closer to the
3We conformed that for ⇢ 2 [3, 7], the result is robust.
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Figure 3.5: The best fitting of the QRE model in Ochs (1995)
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observed value of sL. We can observe this by comparing Figure 2.5 to Figure 2.4. Thus,
the over-prediction of sU by the QRE model can be mitigated by the high risk aversion,
since it was the result of the relatively high dicrepancy between the observed sL and the
Nash equilibrium prediction of it. But the problem is, again, the estimated risk-aversion is
unreasonably high, because Ochs (1995) used the binary lottery procedure to control the
risk attitude. Even though the risk attitude control in Ochs’ experiment was not perfect,
it would be expected that the controlled risk aversion in Ochs (1995) would be lower than
the uncontrolled risk aversion in Goeree et al, (2003), r = 0.31. Harrison et al. (2013)
shows in their experimental study that the binary lottery procedure induces a statistically
significant shift toward risk neutrality.
Next, we show that with our model, the estimated risk aversion, 0.22, is much lower than
the case of the QRE model. Figure 3.6 is the result. The di↵erent feature of our model
to the QRE model is that each player chooses her maximin strategy when the opponent
player’s choice is the Nash equilibrium strategy, rather than the equiprobable strategy as
in the QRE model. To be specific, in this experiment design, player 2’s maximin strategy
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Figure 3.6: The best fitting of the equilibrium with uncertainty aversion in Ochs (1995)
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is the equiprobable strategy, and thus player 2’s best response functions of two models
are very similar. (In linear approximation, they are identical in the sense that they are
pivoting from (sU , sL) =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
). But player 1’s maximin strategy is di↵erent from the
equiprobable strategy, so player 1’s best response of our model is almost a parallel shift
of the best response function of the QRE model. As a result, this experiment gives us
a practical way to test the two models’ performance the most clearly. In Game 2 and
Game 3, the best response function of our model shifts to the left from the QRE model,
because in each game, the maximin strategy sU is smaller than 1/2. This aspect makes
the quantitative di↵erence between the two models’ prediction. Consequently, the QRE
model’s over-prediction problem can be resolved without the unreasonably high value of
risk aversion parameter estimated in the QRE model. Lastly, we show in Figure 3.7 that
with r = 0.22, the over-prediction problem of the QRE model remains substantial, which
shows the significant di↵erence of two models.
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Figure 3.7: The prediction of the QRE model when r = 0.22 in Ochs (1995)
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3.2 Re-examination of Selten and Chmura (2008)
In this section, we first introduce the experiment design of Selton and Chmura (2008).
In this study, there are interesting observations that the actual choice frequencies change
as the payo↵s are linearly transformed, which the mixed strategy Nash equilibria and the
QRE model fail to explain. We then explain our model predicts such equilibrium changes
according to linear payo↵ transformations. Lastly, we show the estimation results using
our model and the QRE model, and conclude that our model’s predictive power for the
data in Selten and Chmura (2008) is significantly better than the QRE model’s.
3.2.1 Experiment Design and Result
12 games in Figure 3.8 are used in the experiment of Selten and Chmura (2008). They
are designed in pairs with linear payo↵ transformations. For instance, the game G10 is
the transformed game of the original game G1. Similar to Ochs (1995), each subjects
participated with fixed roles for 200 rounds (in the original games) or 100 rounds (in the
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transformed games), and they were randomly matched.
Figure 3.9 shows the result of this experiment. The first row shows the results of the pair
of G1 and G10, the pair of G2 and G20, and the pair of G3 and G30, respectively. The
three sub-figures in the second row show the results of remainder. In each sub-figure, the
black circle is the prediction of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, and the black triangle
is the best-fitted prediction of the QRE model. The red dot and the orange dot are
the actual choice frequency in the original game and the transformed game, respectively.
Clearly, there are significant changes in choice frequencies between the original game and
the transformed game, especially in the first four pairs of games. However, the mixed-
strategy Nash equilibria and the QRE model fail to explain these equilibrium changes,
since theoretically both model predict that there should not be equilibrium changes when
there are such linear payo↵ transformations in the experiment design of Selten and Chmura
(2008).
3.2.2 Payo↵ Transformation and Equilibrium Change in the Model of
Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion
Di↵erent from Mixed-strategy Nash equilibria and the QRE model, our model predicts the
equilibrium change when there is a linear payo↵ transformation. We will explain this point
with Game 1 in Figure 1.1 and Game 4 in Figure 1.4. Game 4 is the transformed game
of Game 1 in the same way of Selten and Chmura. Both games have (sU , sL) =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
as
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the quantal response equilibrium under the logit
equilibrium model specification. However, as we have seen in Figure 1.5, the prediction
of equilibrium in Game 4 with our model di↵ers from (sU , sL) =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
. The reason is
as follows: In Game 4, by the linear payo↵ transformation, the maximin strategies of
each players change from sU =
1
2 to sU = 0 for player 1 and from sL =
1
2 to sL = 1
for player 2, repectively. These changes make the shifts of each best response functions,
which are depicted in Figure 1.5. To summarize, the payo↵ transformation changes the
hedging behavior of players, which shifts the best response functions of players. As a result,
the equilibrium, which is the intersection of best response functions, changes according to
payo↵ transformation.
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Figure 3.8: Games in Selten and Chmura (2008)
G1 & G1’ G2 & G2’ G3 & G3’
10 0 9 0 8 0
8 18 4 13 6 14
9 10 6 8 7 10
9 8 7 5 7 4
10 4 9 3 8 3
12 22 7 16 9 17
9 14 6 11 7 13
9 8 7 5 7 4
 5
G4 & G4’ G5 & G5’ G6 & G6’
7 0 7 0 7 1
4 11 2 9 1 7
5 9 4 8 3 8
6 2 5 1 5 0
7 2 7 2 7 3
6 13 4 11 3 9
5 11 4 10 3 10
6 2 5 1 5 0
 6
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Figure 3.9: Observations and estimation results in Selten and Chmura (2008)
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3.2.3 Estimation Results
Figure 3.9 summarized the estimation results. In each sub-figures, the blue dot and the
skyblue dot are the best-fitted predictions of our model in the original game and the
transformed game, respectively. Since we impose the strong restriction that the parameter
representing the degree of uncertainty is identical in all 6 pairs of games, the predictive
power of our model seem to be lower than in the estimation of Ochs (1995). However,
compared to the QRE model, our model, at least in part, explains the change in choice
frequencies; except for the frequency change of player 2 in G2   G20 pair and G3   G30
pair, our model explains the choice behavior at least qualitatively. To confirm that our
model is statistically signicant than the QRE model, we performed the Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed rank test as in Selten and Chmura, and found the significant di↵erence in
performances of two model with significant level of 0.05.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 1:
(a) For KMM : Recall that
 KMMi (si, Pi(si,⌥i)) =
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] ·  i (Ui (si, pi [ri]))
Given Pi(si,⌥i), each  i (Ui (si, pi [ri])) is concave in si, since it is a composite function of
the concave function  i and the linear function Ui. Therefore,  i is concave in si since it
is a positive linear combination of concave functions.
(b) For MMR: Recall that
 MMRi (si, Pi(si,⌥i)) = minQi2 Ri 1
 
RiX
ri=1
Qi[ri] · Ui (si, pi[ri]) + ci (Qi)
!
Let F :  Ri 1 ⇥ RRi denote the function
F (Qi, u) =
RiX
ri=1
Qi[ri] · u[ri] + ci (Qi)
where u = (u[1], ..., u[Ri]). Then, F ⇤(u)
.
= minQi2 Ri 1 (F (Qi, u)) is continuous and
concave in u by the maximum theorem1, since F is convex on  Ri 1 ⇥ RRi and  Ri 1 is
a convex set.
1See Chapter 9 of Sundaram (1996).
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Given Pi(si,⌥i),  MMRi (si, Pi(si,⌥i)) is a composite function of a concave function F
⇤(u)
and a linear function u (si) = (u[1](si), ..., u[Ri](si)), where u[ri](si) = Ui (si, pi[ri]), thus
it is concave in si.
Proof of Lemma 2:
We first observe that for all ri,
Ui (⌧i, pi[ri]) =
KiX
l=1
⌧ li · Ui
⇣
ali, pi[ri]
⌘
=
"
KiX
l=1
sli · Ui
⇣
ali, pi[ri]
⌘#
+
⇣
⌧ki   ski
⌘
· Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri]
⌘
+
⇣
⌧k
0
i   sk
0
i
⌘
· Ui
⇣
ak
0
i , pi[ri]
⌘
=
"
KiX
l=1
sli · Ui
⇣
ali, pi[ri]
⌘#
+
⇣
⌧ki   ski
⌘
·
⇣
Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri]
⌘
  Ui
⇣
ak
0
i , pi[ri]
⌘⌘
>
KiX
l=1
sli · Ui
⇣
ali, pi[ri]
⌘
= Ui (si, pi[ri]) .
Then, for KMM,
 KMMi (⌧i, Pi(si,⌥i)) =
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] ·  i (Ui (⌧i, pi[ri]))
>
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] ·  i (Ui (si, pi[ri])) =  KMMi (si, Pi(si,⌥i)).
For MMR, let W˜i denote the distorted probability for ⌧i. Then,
 MMRi (⌧i, Pi(si,⌥i)) =
RiX
ri=1
W˜i[ri] · Ui (⌧i, pi[ri]) + ci
⇣
W˜i
⌘
>
RiX
ri=1
W˜i[ri] · Ui (si, pi[ri]) + ci
⇣
W˜i
⌘
   MMRi (si, Pi(si,⌥i))
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Proof of Lemma 4:
We first clarify the notation: For a given (s, n), we write
pi[ri] (s, n) = (pj [ri] (sj , n))j 6=i
where each pj [ri] (sj , n) = sj +  j [ri] (n), and  j [ri] (n) is an element of ⌥(n).
It is clear that there exists n such that for all i
C (si(n)) ◆ C (s⇤i ) =
 
a1i , ..., a
 i
i
 
for all n > n. (A.1)
Next, since s⇤ is quasi-strict,
Ui
 
a ii , s
⇤
i
 
> Ui
⇣
aki , s
⇤
i
⌘
for k =  i + 1, ...,Ki. (A.2)
Thus, for all n large enough,
Ui (a
 i
i , pi[ri] (s (n) , n)) > Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri] (s (n) , n)
⌘
for all ri; k =  i + 1, ...,Ki.
The reason is as follows: We can write
Ui (a
 i
i , pi[ri] (s (n) , n))  Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri] (s (n) , n)
⌘
=
h
Ui
 
a ii , s
⇤
i
   Ui ⇣aki , s⇤i⌘i  hUi ⇣aki , pi[ri] (s (n) , n)⌘  Ui ⇣aki , s⇤i⌘i
+
⇥
Ui (a
 i
i , pi[ri] (s (n) , n))  Ui
 
a ii , s
⇤
i
 ⇤
.
In the second line, the first term is positive due to (A.2). The second and the third term
converge to zero since for all j 6= i and for all ri
lim
n!1 pj [ri] (sj (n) , n) = limn!1 (sj(n) +  j [ri] (n)) = s
⇤
j
and Ui
 
aki , pi[ri] (s (n) , n)
 
is continuous in each pj [ri] (s (n) , n). Consequently, by Lemma
3, for all n large enough,
aki /2 C(si(n)) for k =  i + 1, ...,Ki. (A.3)
Finally, by (A.1) and (A.3), for all n large enough and for all i, C (si(n)) = C (s⇤i ).
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Proof of Theorem 1:
We first clarify the following notation: For a given (s, ✏), we write
pi[ri] (s, ✏) = (pj [ri] (sj , ✏))j 6=i
where each pj [ri] (sj , ✏) = sj (✏) +  j [ri] (✏).
Since s⇤ =
 
a11, ..., a
1
n
 
is strict, for all i
Ui
 
a1i , s
⇤
i
 
> Ui
⇣
aki , s
⇤
i
⌘
for k = 2, ...,Ki. (A.4)
Then, we have
lim
✏!0Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri](s
⇤, ✏)
⌘
= Ui
⇣
aki , s
⇤
i
⌘
for all k; all ri. (A.5)
since for all j 6= i and for all ri
lim
✏!0 pj [ri](s
⇤, ✏) = s⇤j + lim
✏!0  j [ri](s
⇤, ✏) = s⇤j .
By (A.4) and (A.5), there exists ✏S 2 (0, ✏¯) such that for all ✏ 2 [0, ✏S)
Ui
 
a1i , pi[ri](s
⇤, ✏)
 
> Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri](s
⇤, ✏)
⌘
for all i; k = 2, ...,Ki; all ri.
Consequently, by Lemma 3-(ii), for all ✏ 2 [0, ✏S)
{s⇤i } =
 
a1i
 
= argmaxti2Si i(ti, Pi(s
⇤
i , ✏)) for all i.
Thus for all ✏ 2 [0, ✏S), s⇤ is an equilibrium under perturbation ⌥ (✏).
Proof of Lemma 5:
(i) For KMM: For a strategy profiles s with C (s) = C (s⇤),
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 KMMi (si, Pi(si,⌥i)) =
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] ·  i (Ui (si, pi[ri]))
=
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] ·  i
 
 i 1X
k=1
ski · 'ki (pi[ri]) + Ui (a ii , pi[ri])
!
Thus for k = 1, ...,  i   1,
@ KMMi
@ski
=
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] · 'ki (pi[ri]( , ✏)) ·  
0
i (Ui (si, pi[ri]( , ✏))) .
We define  ki :
Q
i2I N ⇤i ⇥ [0, ✏¯)! R by
 ki ( , ✏) =
1
 
0
i (Ui (s
⇤))
@ KMMi
@ski
=
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] · 'ki (pi[ri]( , ✏)) ·
 
0
i (Ui (si, pi[ri]( , ✏)))
 
0
i (Ui (s
⇤))
for i 2 I; k = 1, ...,  i   1.
Since  
0
i is strictly positive,  
k
i is well-defined. Let  denote the vector
 =
⇣
 11, ..., 
 1 1
1 ; ...; 
1
i , ..., 
 i 1
i ; ...; 
1
N , ..., 
 N 1
N
⌘
, i 2 I.
 :
Q
i2I N ⇤i ⇥ [0, ✏¯)! R  is continuously di↵erentiable, since we assumed that  i is twice
continuously di↵erentiable and that  i[mi] (✏) is continuously di↵erentiable. The equation
(2.4) in Lemma 5 is equivalent to the following equation:
 ( , ✏) = 0. (A.6)
We know the trivial solution of equation (A.6), ( , ✏) = ( ⇤, 0). We will show that
@ 
@ 
( ⇤, 0) = J⇤. (A.7)
To prove this, observe that
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@ ki
@sk
0
i0
( , 0) =
@
@sk
0
i0
 
'ki (si) ·
 
0
i (Ui (si, si))
 
0
i (Ui (s
⇤))
!
Since 'ki
 
s⇤i
 
= 0 for i 2 I; k = 1, ...,  i   1, by evaluating the above equation at   =  ⇤,
@ ki
@sk
0
i0
( ⇤, 0) =
@'ki
@sk
0
i0
( ⇤) ·
 
 
0
i (Ui (s
⇤))
 
0
i (Ui (s
⇤))
!
+ 'ki
 
s⇤i
  · @
@sk
0
i0
 
 
0
i (Ui (si, si))
 
0
i (Ui (s
⇤))
!     
 ⇤
=
@'ki
@sk
0
i0
( ⇤) .
Therefore we have (A.7). J⇤ is assumed non-singular, thus J ( ⇤; 0) is non-singular. Con-
sequently, by the implicit function theorem, there exists c and there exists a unique con-
tinuously di↵erentiable function   : [0, ✏L5)!Qi2I N ⇤i such that  ( (✏), ✏) = 0 for all ✏ 2
[0, ✏L5), and  (0) =  ⇤.
(ii) For MMR: Recall that for  i =
⇣
s1i , ..., s
 i 1
i
⌘
,
 MMRi ( i, Pi(si,⌥i)) = minQi
 
RiX
ri=1
Qi[ri] · Ui ( i, pi[ri]) + ci (Qi)
!
Consider  
0
i =  i + ta
k
i =
⇣
s1i , ..., t+ s
k
i , ..., s
 i 1
i
⌘
for su ciently small t > 0. Then,
 MMRi ( 
0
i, Pi(si)) = minQi
 
RiX
ri=1
Qi[ri] ·
⇣
Ui ( i, pi[ri]) + t'
k
i (pi[ri])
⌘
+ ci (Qi)
!
.
Thus,
@ MMRi
@ski
= lim
t!0
 MMRi ( 
0
i, Pi(si,⌥i))   MMRi ( i, Pi(si,⌥i))
t
=
RiX
ri=1
Q˜i[ri] · 'ki (pi[ri])
where Q˜i is the distorted probability for  i. The above equation holds since µi (and
therefore ci) is strictly convex, and thus  MMRi is di↵erentiable.
The remaining part is almost identical to the case of KMMmodel, but we need to show that
for all i 2 I, Q˜i is continuously di↵erentiable on a neighborhood of ( ⇤, 0) in
Q
i2I N ⇤i ⇥
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[0, ✏¯). With an abuse of notation, we sometimes denote (Qi[1], ..., Qi[Ri   1]) 2  Ri 1c by
Qi, since it fully charterizes (Qi[1], ..., Qi[Ri]) 2  Ri 1 . Then, we can rewrite Q˜i as
n
Q˜i
o
= argmin
Qi2 Ri 1c
 
Ri 1X
ri=1
Qi[ri] · ⇠i[ri] + Ui ( i, pi[Ri]) + ci (Qi)
!
= argmin
Qi2 Ri 1c
 
Ri 1X
ri=1
Qi[ri] · ⇠i[ri] + ci (Qi)
!
where ⇠i[ri] = Ui ( i, pi[ri]) Ui ( i, pi[Ri]) for ri = 1, ..., Ri 1. By the maximum theorem,
Q˜i is a continuous function in ⇠i = (⇠i[1], ..., ⇠i[Ri   1]) 2 RRi 1. We now show that for ⇠i
close enough to zero, Q˜i is in the interior of simplex and moreover continuously di↵eren-
tiable in ⇠i. First, due to continuity and the fact that Q˜i (⇠i = 0) =Wi 2 int
 
 Ri 1c
 
, there
exists an open ball B (0;  ) ✓ RRi 1 such that for any ⇠i 2 B (0;  ), Q˜i (⇠i) 2 int
 
 Ri 1c
 
.
Then, for ⇠i 2 B (0,  ), Q˜i is a solution of the following first order condition with respect
to Qi:
&i[ri]
.
= ⇠i[ri] + ✓i
✓
!i[ri]µ
0
i
✓
Qi[ri]
Wi[ri]
◆
  !i[Ri]µ0i
✓
Qi[Ri]
Wi[Ri]
◆◆
= 0 for ri = 1, ..., Ri   1.
(A.8)
We denote (&i[1], ..., &i[Ri   1]) by &i. Then, &i : B (0,  )⇥ Ri 1c ! RRi 1 is a continuously
di↵erentiable function of (⇠i, Qi), since µi is twice continuously di↵erentiable. Observe that
&i (0,Wi) = 0 since µ
0
i(1) = 0. We also have that
@&i
@Qi
=
2666664
 i[1] +  i[Ri]  i[Ri] · · ·  i[Ri]
 i[Ri]  i[2] +  i[Ri] · · ·  i[Ri]
...
...
...
 i[Ri]  i[Ri] · · ·  i[Ri   1] +  i[Ri]
3777775
where  i[ri] = ✓i!i[ri]µ
00
i
⇣
Qi[ri]
Wi[ri]
⌘
1
Wi[ri]
for ri = 1, ..., Ri   1, which are strictly positive.
Since @&i@Qi is positive definite, it is non-singular. Consequently, by the impicit function
theorem, there exists an open ball B
⇣
0;  
0⌘ ✓ B (0;  ) such that for any ⇠i 2 B ⇣0;  0⌘, the
solution Q˜i (⇠i) of the equation (A.8) is continuously di↵erentiable in ⇠i.
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Then, due to continuity of ⇠i in ( , ✏) and the fact that ⇠i( ⇤, 0) = 0, there exists an open
ballB (( ⇤, 0) ;  i) ✓
Q
i2I N ⇤i⇥[0, ✏¯) such that ( , ✏) 2 B (( ⇤, 0) ;  i) implies ⇠i 2 B
⇣
0;  
0⌘
.
Also, since ⇠i is continuously di↵erentiable for ( , ✏) in
Q
i2I N ⇤i ⇥ [0, ✏¯), Q˜i is continuously
di↵erentiable for ( , ✏) in B (( ⇤, 0) ;  i). Lastly, we take  ¯ = mini2I { i} . Then, for all i 2 I,
Q˜i is continuously di↵erentiable on an open set U = B
 
( ⇤, 0) ;  ¯
  ✓Qi2I N ⇤i ⇥ [0, ✏¯).
Next, we define  ki : U ! R by
 ki ( , ✏) =
@ MMRi
@ski
=
RiX
ri=1
Q˜i[ri] · 'ki (pi[ri](✏)) for i 2 I; k = 1, ...,  i   1.
Let  denote the vector
 =
⇣
 11, ..., 
 1 1
1 ; ...; 
1
i , ..., 
 i 1
i ; ...; 
1
N , ..., 
 N 1
N
⌘
, i 2 I.
Then  : U ! R  is a continuously di↵erentiable function with  ( ⇤, 0) = 0. we also have
that
@ 
@ 
( ⇤, 0) = J⇤,
since
 ki ( , 0) =
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] · 'ki (si) = 'ki (si) for i 2 I; k = 1, ...,  i   1.
Consequently, by the implicit function theorem, there exist ✏L5 2 (0, ✏¯) and a unique con-
tinuously di↵erentiable function   : [0, ✏L5)!Qi2I N ⇤i such that  ( (✏), ✏) = 0 for all ✏ 2
[0, ✏L5) and  (0) =  ⇤.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Suppose that for a given quasi-strict equilibrium s⇤ and given {⌥ (✏)}✏ 0, we have found
✏L5 > 0 and a unique family {s(✏)}✏2(0,✏L5) of strategy profiles with C (s(✏)) = C (s⇤) which
satisfy the condition (i) and (ii) in Lemma 5. Then, there exists ✏QS 2  0, ✏L5  such that
for any ✏ 2 [0, ✏QS),
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Ui (a
 i
i , pi[ri](s(✏), ✏)) > Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri](s(✏), ✏)
⌘
for all i; all ri; k =  i + 1, ...,Ki.
The reason is that
Ui
 
a ii , s
⇤
i
 
> Ui
⇣
aki , s
⇤
i
⌘
for all i; k =  i + 1, ...,Ki
and
lim
✏!0Ui
⇣
aki , pi[ri](s(✏), ✏)
⌘
= Ui
⇣
aki , s
⇤
i
⌘
for all i; all ri; all k.
Thus, for player i /2 I, si (✏) = a1i satisfies (2.5) by Lemma 3-(ii). For player i 2 I, by
Lemma 3-(i), the condition that
C (si (✏)) ✓
 
a1i , ..., a
 i
i
 
is a necessary condition for si (✏) to satisfy (2.5). Thus, the condition (i) in Lemma 5 is
the first order condition of (2.5). This first order condition is su ceint due to concavity of
 i which is proven in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 6:
(i) For KMM: D2h
⇣
 i( i (✏) , Pi(si (✏) , ✏))
⌘
< 0 for any h 6= 0 if and only if
hT ·H i (s(✏)) · h < 0 for any h 6= 0. (A.9)
Due to the particular structure of  i, we have
H i (s(✏)) =
RiX
ri=1
Wi[ri] ·H i[ri] (s(✏))
where  i [ri] =  i (Ui ( i, pi [ri] (s (✏) , ✏))) =  i
⇣P i 1
k=1 s
k
i · ↵ki [ri] + Ui (a ii , pi [ri] (s (✏) , ✏))
⌘
.
Thus,
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H i[ri] (s(✏)) =
266664
@2 i[ri]
@(s1i )
2 · · · @
2 i[ri]
@s1i @s
 i 1
i
...
...
@2 i[ri]
@s
 i 1
i @s
1
i
· · · @2 i[ri]
@
⇣
s
 i 1
i
⌘2
377775
s(✏)
=
26664
 
↵1i [ri]
 2 · · · ↵1i [ri]↵ i 1i [ri]
...
...
↵ i 1i [ri]↵
1
i [ri] · · ·
⇣
↵ i 1i [ri]
⌘2
37775 ·  00i [ri]   s(✏)
where  
00
i [ri] =  
00
i (Ui ( i, pi [ri] (s (✏) , ✏))) . And the condition (A.9) is equivalent to the
condition that
RiX
ri=1
Wi [ri] ·
⇥
hT ·H i[ri] (s(✏)) · h
⇤
< 0 for any h 6= 0. (A.10)
Let h =
 
h1, ..., h i 1
 T 6= 0. Then,
hT ·H i[ri] (s(✏)) · h =
0@ i 1X
k=1
↵ki [ri] · hk
1A2 ·  00i [ri]   
s(✏)
=
⇣
↵i [ri]
T · h
⌘2 ·  00i [ri]   
s(✏)
Consequently, we have
RiX
ri=1
Wi [ri] ·
⇥
hT ·H i[ri] (s(✏)) · h
⇤
=
RiX
ri=1
Wi [ri] ·
⇣
↵i [ri]
T · h
⌘2 ·  00i [ri]   
s(✏)
.
Since Wi is strictly positive and  
00
i is strictly negative in any case, the condition (A.10)
holds if and only if there is no h 6= 0 such that ↵i [ri]T ·h = 0 for all ri, or equivalently, ↵Ti ·
h = 0. Again, this condition is equivalent to the following condition: ↵i has full row rank,  i 
1.
(ii) For MMR: For notational simplicity, we denote  MMRi ( i, Pi(si,⌥i)) for a given Pi(si,⌥i)
by V ( i),
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V ( i) = minQi
 
RiX
ri=1
Qi[ri] · Ui ( i, pi[ri]) + ci (Qi)
!
.
In the proof of Lemma 5, we obtained that
@ MMRi
@ski
=
RiX
ri=1
Q˜i[ri] · 'ki (pi[ri]) (A.11)
where Q˜i is the distorted probability for  i.
@ MMRi
@ski
is a directional derivative of V in the
direction of ek.2 Thus, we can write (A.11) in the form
V
0
( i; ek) =
RiX
ri=1
Q˜i[ri] · 'ki (pi[ri]) .
Therefore we have that for any non-zero h 2 R i 1,
V
0
( i;h) =
RiX
ri=1
Q˜i[ri] ·
⇣
'i (pi[ri])
T · h
⌘
where 'i (pi[ri]) =
⇣
'1i (pi[ri]) , ...,'
 i 1
i (pi[ri])
⌘T
. Given that Pi(si,⌥i) = Pi(si (✏) , ✏),
V
0
( i;h) =
RiX
ri=1
Q˜i[ri] ·
 
↵i[ri]
T · h  . (A.12)
We have shown in Lemma 5 that
V
0
( i(✏);h) =
RiX
ri=1
W˜i[ri] ·
 
↵i[ri]
T · h  = 0 for any h 6= 0
where W˜i is the distorted probability for  i (✏).
We want to prove that
lim
t!0
V
0
( i (✏) + th;h)  V 0 ( i (✏) ;h)
t
< 0 for any h 6= 0. (A.13)
Observe that by (A.12),
2We denote by ek the kth standard unit vector of R i 1.
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V
0
( i (✏) + th;h) =
RiX
ri=1
W˜
0
i [ri] ·
 
↵i[ri]
T · h 
where W˜i is the distorted probability for  i + th. Thus,
V
0
( i (✏) + th;h)  V 0 ( i (✏) ;h)
t
=
RiX
ri=1
 
W˜
0
i [ri]  W˜i[ri]
t
!
·  ↵i[ri]T · h  .
To prove (A.13), we first have to show that the second directional derivative at  i (✏) exists.
As we have shown in the proof of Lemma 5, for any ✏ 2  0, ✏QS , W˜i is di↵erentiable.
Thus limt!0
W˜
0
i W˜i
t exists and the second directional derivative of V at  i (✏) exists. To
be more specific, recall the equation (A.8) in the proof of Lemma 5. Both W˜i and W˜
0
i
are solutions of this equation of Qi where ⇠i[ri] = Ui ( i(✏), pi[ri])   Ui ( i(✏), pi[Ri]) and
⇠i[ri] = Ui ( i(✏) + th, pi[ri])   Ui ( i(✏) + th, pi[Ri]), respectively. Since @&i@Qi evaluated at
W˜i is non-singular, by the implicit function theorem, we have the following result:
lim
t!0
W˜
0
i   W˜i
t
=  
"✓
@&i
@Qi
◆    
W˜i
# 1
·  ↵Ti · h  (A.14)
Consequently, the condition (A.13) is equivalent to the following condition: For any su -
ciently small t > 0,
V
0
( i (✏) + th;h)  V 0 ( i (✏) ;h) < 0 for any h 6= 0
or equivalently,
RiX
ri=1
⇣
W˜
0
i [ri]  W˜i[ri]
⌘
·  ↵i[ri]T · h  < 0 for any h 6= 0. (A.15)
We will show two things:
(a)
PRi
ri=1
⇣
W˜
0
i [ri]  W˜i[ri]
⌘
·  ↵i[ri]T · h   0 for any h.
(b)
RiX
ri=1
⇣
W˜
0
i [ri]  W˜i[ri]
⌘
·  ↵i[ri]T · h  = 0 (A.16)
if and only if ↵i [ri]
T · h = 0 for all ri, or equivalently, ↵Ti · h = 0.
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To show (a), observe that
V ( i(✏)) =
RiX
ri=1
W˜i[ri] · Ui ( i(✏), pi[ri]) + ci
⇣
W˜i
⌘

RiX
ri=1
W˜
0
i [ri] · Ui ( i(✏), pi[ri]) + ci
⇣
W˜
0
i
⌘
.
(A.17)
and that
V ( i(✏) + th) =
RiX
ri=1
W˜
0
i [ri] ·
 
Ui ( i(✏), pi[ri]) + t↵i[ri]
T · h + ci ⇣W˜ 0i⌘

RiX
ri=1
W˜i[ri] ·
 
Ui ( i(✏), pi[ri]) + t↵i[ri]
T · h + ci ⇣W˜i⌘ . (A.18)
Since t > 0, we obtain (a) by combining (A.17) and (A.18). Next, (A.16) holds if and only
if both inequalities in (A.17) and (A.18) hold as equality if and only if W˜
0
i = W˜i due to
strict convexity of ci. From (A.14), for any su ciently small t > 0,
W˜
0
i = W˜i  
"✓
@&i
@Qi
◆    
W˜i
# 1
·  ↵Ti · h  · t.
Thus, W˜
0
i = W˜i if and only if ↵
T
i · h = 0. Consequently, the condition (A.15) holds if and
only if the solution of the following equation of h, ↵Ti · h = 0, is only zero.
Proof of Lemma 7:
Let ↵i,j denote the aggregation matrix of ↵i [Ri \mj ], mj = 1, ...,Mj   1:
↵i,j =
h
↵i [Ri \ 1] · · · ↵i [Ri \Mj   1]
i
.
Let
P =
h
↵i,1 · · · ↵i,j · · · ↵i,n ↵i(Ri)
i
,j 6= i, j 2 I, and
Q =
h
↵ˆi,1 · · · ↵ˆi,j · · · ↵ˆi,n ↵i(Ri)
i
=
h
↵ˆi ↵i(Ri)
i
,j 6= i, j 2 I.
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We will show that rank (↵i)   rank (P ) = rank (Q)   rank (↵ˆi) . The first inequality holds
because we obtain P from ↵i by selecting the particular columns of ↵i. The last inequality
also holds trivially. We prove the second equality. We first show that we can obtainh
↵ˆi,j ↵i(Ri)
i
from
h
↵i,j ↵i(Ri)
i
by elementary column operations:
(i) By cMj !
PMj
mj=1
wj [mj ]cmj ,
h
↵i,j ↵i(Ri)
i
!
h
↵i,j ↵¯i,j
i
.
(ii) By cmj ! cmj   cMj for mj = 1, ...,Mj   1,
h
↵i,j ↵¯i,j
i
!
h
↵ˆi,j ↵¯i,j
i
.
(iii) By cMj ! cMj   1wj [Mj ]
PMj 1
mj=1
wj [mj ]cmj ,
h
↵ˆi,j ↵¯i,j
i
!
h
↵ˆi,j ↵i(Ri)
i
.
Therefore we can obtain Q from P by repeating the above elementary column operations.
Proof of Lemma 8:
Suppose that m⇥ n matrix P 0 has rank p  min (m,n). Then we can make p⇥ p matrix
Q0 by selecting particular rows and columns from P 0 so that Q0 is non-singular, i.e.
det
 
Q0
  6= 0. With the same selected rows and columns, we make p⇥ p matrix Q(✏) from
P (✏). It is obvious that lim✏!0Q(✏) = Q0. Thus, there exists ✏0 > 0 such that for all
✏ 2 [0, ✏0), det (Q ((✏)) 6= 0. This is because the determinant of matrix is a continuous
function of all elements of the matrix, and all elements of Q(✏) converges to the elements
of Q0. Thus, for all ✏ 2 [0, ✏0), rank (Q(✏)) = p. Clearly, rank (P (✏))   rank (Q(✏)) = p.
Proof of Theorem 3:
First, for player i /2 I, it is an immediate result of Theorem 2 that (2.2) holds for any
✏ 2 (0, ✏QS). Next, consider player i 2 I. By Lemma 7, we aim to show that there exists
✏QS⇤ 2  0, ✏A  such that for any ✏ 2  0, ✏QS⇤ , ↵ˆi has full column rank, ,  i 1, for all i 2 I.
The sketch of proof already has been shown in Examples 2 and 3. Recall that
↵ˆi =
h
↵ˆi,1 · · · ↵ˆi,j · · · ↵ˆi,n
i
,j 6= i, j 2 I.
We will reformulate ↵ˆi,j for each j. Since ↵ˆi,j =
h
↵ˆi [Ri \ 1] · · · ↵ˆi [Ri \Mj   1]
i
, we
first need to reformulate the mjth column vector ↵ˆi [Ri \mj ]. Consider the kth element of
it.
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↵ˆki [Ri \mj ]
=↵ki [Ri \mj ]  ↵¯ki,j
=
"
@'ki
@s1j
, ...,
@'ki
@s
 j 1
j
,
@'ki
@s
 j+1
j
, ...,
@'ki
@sKij
#
pi[Ri](s(✏),✏)
·
⇣
 ˆ1j [mj ](✏), ...,  ˆ
 j 1
j [mj ](✏),  ˆ
 j+1
j [mj ](✏), ...,  ˆ
Kj
j [mj ](✏)
⌘T
=✏ · J'ki ( j)
   
pi[Ri](s(✏),✏)
·
⇣
⌘ˆ1j [mj ], ..., ⌘ˆ
 j 1
j [mj ]
⌘T
+ J'ki (sj)
   
pi[Ri](s(✏),✏)
·
⇣
⌫ˆ1j [mj ](✏), ..., ⌫ˆ
 j 1
j [mj ](✏), ⌫ˆ
 j+1
j [mj ](✏), ..., ⌫ˆ
Kj
j [mj ](✏)
⌘T
=✏ · J'ki ( j)
   
pi[Ri](s(✏),✏)
· ⌘ˆj [mj ] + J'ki (sj)
   
pi[Ri](s(✏),✏)
· ⌫ˆj [mj ](✏)
Thus,
↵ˆi [Ri \mj ] =
2664
↵ˆ1i [Ri \mj ]
...
↵ˆ i 1i [Ri \mj ]
3775
= ✏ · J'i( j)|pi[Ri](s(✏),✏) · ⌘ˆj [mj ] + J'i(sj)|pi[Ri](s(✏),✏) · ⌫ˆj [mj ](✏).
Then,
↵ˆi,j =
h
↵ˆi [Ri \ 1] · · · ↵ˆi [Ri \Mj   1]
i
= ✏ · J'i( j)|pi[Ri](s(✏),✏) ·
h
⌘ˆj [1] · · · ⌘ˆj [Mj   1]
i
+ J'i(sj)|pi[Ri](s(✏),✏) ·
h
⌫ˆj [1](✏) · · · ⌫ˆj [Mj   1](✏)
i
= ✏ · J'i( j)|pi[Ri](s(✏),✏) · ⌘ˆj + J'i(sj)|pi[Ri](s(✏),✏) · ⌫ˆj(✏)
We can divide the equation by any non-zero ✏, and we have
1
✏
↵ˆi,j = J'i( j)|pi[Ri](s(✏),✏) · ⌘ˆj +Ri,j(✏)
where Ri,j(✏) = J'i(sj)|pi[Ri](s(✏),✏) · 1✏ ⌫ˆj(✏). Consequently, we have that
1
✏
↵ˆi = =
h
1
✏ ↵ˆi,1 · · · 1✏ ↵ˆi,j · · · 1✏ ↵ˆi,n
i
= J'i ( i)| p1[R1](s(✏),✏) · ⇤i +Ri (✏)
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where
J'i ( i) =
h
J'i ( 1) · · · J'i ( j) · · · J'i ( n)
i
,
⇤i =
2666666664
⌘ˆ1 · · · O · · · O
...
...
...
...
...
O · · · ⌘ˆj · · · O
...
...
... · · · ...
O · · · O · · · ⌘ˆn
3777777775
, j 6= i, j 2 I, and
Ri (✏) =
h
Ri,1(✏) · · · Ri,j(✏) · · · Ri,n(✏)
i
, j 6= i, j 2 I.
Then, we have that lim✏!0 1✏ ↵ˆi = J
⇤
i · ⇤i, because
lim
✏!0 J'i ( i)| p1[R1](s(✏),✏) = J'i ( i)|s⇤i = J
⇤
i ,
lim
✏!0 J'i(sj)|p1[R1](s(✏),✏) = J'i(sj)|s⇤i
lim
✏!0
1
✏
⌫ˆj(✏) = 0, and thus lim
✏!0Ri,j(✏) = 0 and lim✏!0Ri (✏) = 0.
Therefore, by Lemma 8, there exists ✏(i) 2 (0, ✏A) such for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏(i))
rank
✓
1
✏
↵ˆi
◆
  rank (J⇤i · ⇤i) .
⇤i has full row rank since each ⌘ˆj has full row rank. Also J⇤i has full row rank,  i 1, since
J⇤ is non-singular. To be specific, we can write
J' ( ) =
2666666664
J'1 ( )
...
J'i ( )
...
J'n ( )
3777777775
where i 2 I. Thus J' ( ) is non-singular only if each J'i ( ) has full row rank. Also,
rank (J'i ( )) = rank (J'i ( i)), since J'i ( i), which is the part of J'i ( ), is trivially a
zero matrix. Thus J⇤ is non-singular only if each J⇤i has full row rank.
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Consequently, for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏(i))
rank (↵ˆi) = rank
✓
1
✏
↵ˆi
◆
=  i   1. (A.19)
Finally, we define ✏QS⇤ by ✏QS⇤ = mini2I
 
✏(i)
 
. Then for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏QS⇤), (A.19) holds
for all i 2 I. Since ✏QS⇤ < ✏QS , for any ✏ 2 (0, ✏QS⇤), si(✏) is strictly preferred for all
i = 1, ..., N . Thus s(✏) is strictly stable. We complete the proof.
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